



**In the name of Allah  
the most  
Compassionate and Merciful**

IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE  
COMPASSIONATE, THE MERCIFUL

Having published the documents concerned with Shariatmadari, Moghaddam Maraghei and Hassan Nazieh in the book No. 5 of the Moderates, the present book contains documents about Abbas Amir Entezam (in addition to those included in book No. 10), Bahram Bahramian, Khosrow Qashqai, Sam Sanjabi, Ali Saifpour-Fatemi, Touraj and Fereidun Nasseri.

Like the previous book, explanatory notes are provided to further familiarize the reader(s) with the text of documents concerning every one of the above mentioned individuals, with the hope of having taken another step in exposing U.S. imperialism's local bases, while having frustrated America's efforts in placing deviate currents vis-a-vis the Islamic Revolution.

Muslim Students, following  
the Line of the Imam.  
March 1986

The Center for the Publication of  
the U.S. Espionage Den's Documents  
Ayatollah Taleghani and Dr. Mofatteh intersection,  
P.O. Box: 15815-3489 Tel: 824005

## Contents

### The contents of the documents concerned with Entezam:

1. Plans for Adlesick's meeting with Entezam in Sweden.
2. Plans for a meeting between John Stempel and Adlesick.
3. The real identity of Adlesick.
4. Record of Entezam's C. I. A. connection.
5. Willingness for the exchange of explanatory notes.
6. (a) The meeting of Entezam, Yazdi and Bazargan with Bedan Coupuff.
6. A meeting between Adlesick and Entezam.
7. Resumption of an intelligence connection.
8. Entezam's connection and close attachment to the C. I. A.
9. An intelligence instruction.
10. Entezam's contact with the chief of the C. I. A. station in order to set a time for a consultative meeting.
11. Postponement of the consultative meeting.
12. Amir Entezam's consent for postponing the meeting.
13. Arrangements for the consultative meeting.

### The contents of the documents concerning Bahram Bahramian:

1. The exchange of rials into dollars for Bahram Bahramian.
2. Bahramian's account number.
3. Fixing an operational address for Bahramian.
4. Endorsement of the proposed address by the London base.
5. The procedures for Bahramian's correspondence with the operational address.
6. The procedures for Bahramian's correspondence with the operational address.
7. Operational address.
8. Bahramian's back-ground, his relations with the Liberation Movement, contacts with the C. I. A.
9. General approval by the C. I. A. director of the operational address and the procedures for correspondence.
10. Bahramian's request for securing a place of residence for himself of obtaining U. S. citizenship.
11. Details of contact between the C. I. A. and Bahramian.
12. Plans for contact and meeting.
13. A clarification concerning the identities of persons mentioned in document No. 12.
14. Telephone contact between Bahramian and the Tehran station.
15. Radio frequencies fixed for Bahramian's contact with the C. I. A. in emergency cases.
16. Technical specifications of the radio set possessed by Bahramian.
17. The records of Bahramian's life insurance policy and taxes.
18. Radioprint activator.
19. A plan for contact and meeting.
20. Bahramian's past record provisional approval of operations commitments - contacts (secret radio contacts) - training in security and code-writing - and successes in (contact with Yazdi during the time of the attack on the embassy on February 14th).
21. The station's plans for using Bahramian's services; and the mode of meeting him.
22. The efforts of the group including Ayatullah Taleghani for the merger of the religious and secular forces to form a new interim government. (information source: Bahramian).
23. Comments regarding the reports.
24. Bahramian's request during a telephone contact.
25. Telephone contact with Bahramian and the apparent danger to his security - plans for leaving the country.

26. Bahramian's traits and characteristics.
27. A supplementary clarification of the previous document.
28. The plans for his secret exit and the forging of documents for him.
29. Preliminaries and essential documents for making forged passport for Bahramian.
30. Collecting all essential documents for getting Portuguese passport and Macoian identity card.
31. Evaluations and views concerning the reports.
32. Details concerning Portuguese passport.
33. The handwritten text of Ahern's report about Bahramian.
34. The text of Ahern's comments about Bahramian.

### The contents of the documents concerning Khusro Qashqai:

1. Khusro Qashqai's past record.
2. Qashqai's biographical data.
3. Conversation with Qashqai.
4. The record.
5. Qashqai's meeting with Foneset, the representative of the American Consulate.
6. Mr. Komo.
7. Khusro Khan Qashqai.
8. Qashqai's plans.
9. Refusal to give Qashqai American visa.
10. Political activities of the Qashqai Tribe and the preparation for the future.
11. The views of the chief of the Qashqai Tribe about the situation in Iran.
12. Supplementary technical details of the previous document.
13. Activities regarding the plan for publishing a daily newspaper with the help of Qashqai.
14. Evaluations and views of Qashqai's report.
15. Political activities and security concerns of the Khuzistan governor Madani.
16. The military and political activities of the Qashqai Tribe.
17. Bakhtiari's efforts for gaining support for the moderates in Iran.
18. Evaluations and views of the C. I. A. about Qashqai's reports.
19. A meeting with Qashqai.
20. Qashqai's views about high ranking Iranian officials as well as the political activities of the Qashqai Tribe.
21. Qashqai's views on his meeting with Khomeini and the recent political changes.
22. Supplementary technical details of the previous documents.
23. The text of Ahern's hand written report about Khusro Qashqai.
24. The text of Ahern's comments about Khusro Qashqai.

### The contents of the documents concerning Sanjabi and Forouhar.

1. Readiness of the C. I. A. headquarters to meet with Sanjabi.
1. (a) Information concerning the citizenship of Yazdi.
2. The turning down of Sanjabi's request by the C. I. A.
3. Sam Sanjabi (Karim Sanjabi's son) and the C. I. A.
4. Sam Sanjabi and the C. I. A.
5. Forouhar's remarks on the change of cabinet.
6. Forouhar's comments.

The contents of the documents concerning Ali Seifpur Fatemi and S. D. Rite.

1. A brief account of Fatemi and his beliefs.
2. The programme for contacting Fatemi after his exit from the country.
3. Address and telephone number of Fatemi.
4. Contact with S. D. Rite concerning Fatemi.
5. The C. I. A. headquarters' directive about making contacts with Fatemi.
6. Biographical data of Fatemi (and the record of his student-days, a Foreign Ministry document).
7. The educational record and Fatemi's difficulty in getting American citizenship.
8. Iranian students.
9. Continuation of the topic of Fatemi's educational record, and his difficulty in getting American citizenship.
10. The action taken by the Department of Immigration and Citizenship concerning Ali Fatemi.

The contents of the documents concerning Touraj and Feridun Nasser:

1. The plan for contacting Touraj Nasser and record of his past contacts.
2. Determination of identity.
3. Feridun Nasser's biographic data and the record of his C. I. A. connections.
4. Future plans of Dr. Nasser.
5. Feridun Nasser's record.

Real Name: Amir Abbas Entezam.

Code Name: S. D. Plod/1.

Occupation: Prime minister Bazargan's deputy, the provisional government's spokesman, and a liberation movement member.

The present documents about Amir Entezam are in the form of classified documents, which were completed or found after the publication of book 10 concerning Amir Entezam. These documents are indicative of the continuation of the C. I. A. 's operational tactics concerning exchange of information with the provisional government of Bazargan. Two more points can be distinctly noticed in addition to that which has been mentioned in book 10: 1- Amir Entezam had connections with the C. I. A. and with George Cave (Adelisk), a senior C. I. A. agent, since the beginning of 1340 (1961). 2- In appointing Amir Entezam as ambassador to Stockholm two objectives were pursued by the leaders of the Liberation Movement (provisional government). Firstly, that he would act as the agent of the provisional government for re-establishing its connections with the C. I. A. and exchanging information with it. Secondly he was to allure the Iranians living in Europe in to returning home.

SECRET 311251Z JUL 79 STAFF

1 AUG 79 04 02Z

CITE DIRECTOR 485969.

TO: PRIORITY STOCKHOLM INFO TEHRAN.

WNINTEL RYBAT AJAJA

REF: STOCKHOLM 25929

1. DEPARTMENT IS SENDING TELEGRAM TO EMBASSY STOCKHOLM ASKING THEM TO CONTACT NEW IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO SWEDEN AMIR ENTEZAM. EMBASSY IS TO PROPOSE TO ENTEZAM THAT FSO WHO WELL KNOWN TO ENTEZAM TRAVEL TO STOCKHOLM TO MEET WITH HIM.

2. FYI ONLY. THIS ACTION BEING TAKEN BY DEPARTMENT AT RTACTION INVESTIGATION. IF ENTEZAM AGREES TO MEETING, PLAN HAVE FORMER DOOS TEHRAN, JOSEPH M. ADLESICK ACCOMPANY FSO AND MEET WITH ENTEZAM. COS AT HIS DISCRETION MAY INFORM CHARGE THAT MEETINGS WITH ENTEZAM ARE BEING PUSHED BY SENIOR LEVELS USC AS MEANS EXPANDING USG CONTACTS WITH PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN.

3. ALL CONCERNED WOULD LIKE PULL OFF THIS MEETING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

4. NO FILE. RVM 31 JULY 99 DRV DGC.1 ALL SECRET.

SECRET  
BT  
#7934

1 AUG 79 11 23Z

SECRET 031634Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 488309.

TO: IMMEDIATE STOCKHOLM INFO TEHRAN.

IACT STOCKHOLM.

NINTEL RYBAT AJAJA

REF: DIRECTOR 485969

1. ADLESICK WILL ACCOMPANY ISMR. JOHN STEMPLE ON TRIP TO STOCKHOLM ARRIVING STOCKHOLM SUNDAY MORNING BY NORTHWEST AIRLINE FLIGHT 36.

2. REQUEST STATION MAKE HOTEL RESERVATIONS FOR ADLESICK (IDEN) AND LEAVE MESSAGE WITH NORTHWEST AT AIRPORT. WOULD PREFER RESERVATIONS IN SAME HOTEL EMBASSY MAKING RESERVATIONS FOR STEMPLE.

3. NO FILE. RVM 3 AUG 99. DRV DGC.1. ALL SECRET.

SECRET  
BT  
#2604

S E C R E T 231342Z AUG 99 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 43996

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT SDPLOD


REF: DIRECTOR

1. BIEDENKOPF BRIEFED, BAZARGAN, YAZDI, AND ENTEZAM ON AREA SITUATION FOR TWO HOURS ON 22 AUGUST. CHARGE AND POLITICAL COUNSELOR ALSO PRESENT. LENGTH OF SESSION, ( WAS TO BE ONE HOUR) AND NUMEROUS QUESTIONS INDICATE ..... WELL RECIEVED.

2. AFTER BRIEFING, BAZARGAN THROUGH ENTEZAM STATED HE HOPED SIMILAR BRIEFINGS COULD BE PROVIDED EVERY TWO MONTHS, OR MORE ..... IF SPECIAL NEED AROSE. BAZARGAN WAS TOLD RESPONSE TO THIS WOULD BE WORKED OUT THROUGH CHARGE AFTER WASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS. ENTEZAM THEN SAID "WE HOPE YOUR ORGANIZATION WILL IMPROVE ITS TIES WITH US JUST AS OUR COUNTRIES ARE IMPROVING TIES THROUGH THE EFFORTS OF THE CHARGE AND DR YAZDI. ENTEZAM WAS RIGHT NEXT TO BAZARGAN AND WHEN HE SAID THIS (BAZARGAN UNDERSTANDS ENGLISH TO HAVE CAUGHT THE MEANING) BUT THERE WAS NO INDICATION THIS STATEMENT CAME FROM BAZARGAN. BIEDENKOPF DID NOT REVEAL RTACTION CONNECTION OR RESPOND ADLESICK APOLOGY FOR HIS INABILITY TO COME AND ENTEZAM SAID HE UNDERSTOOD AND LOOKED FORWARD TO SEEING HIM IN STOCKHOLM. ENTEZAM SAID HE DEPARTING TEHRAN FOR STOCKHOLM ON 23 AUGUST AND WANTED TO SEE ADLESICK SHORTLY AFTER HIS RETURN. ENTEZAM HAD BEEN VISITING KHOMEINI IN QOM EARLIER IN THE DAY SO IT IS POSSIBLE HE HAS SOME INT. OF VALUE.

3. NO FILE. RVW 22 AUG 99 DRV D9C1. ALL SECRET

DIRECTLY TO THIS COMMENT. GETTING ENTEZAM ASIDE, BIEDENKOPF EXPRESSED





13 AUG 79 131320Z AUG 79 STAFF  
DIRECTOR 493618

IMMEDIATE STOCKHOLM INFO TEHRAN.  
MINTEL RYBAT SDPL00

1. RE DISCUSSIONS WITH ADLESICK DURING RECENT TDY STOCKHOLM.  
REAST COS PASE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO DCM: "PLEASE CONTACT MR. AMIR  
ENTRIZAM AND TELL HIM THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO GIVE THE BRIEFING ANY  
DAY AFTER 10 SEPTEMBER. PLEASE HAVE MR. AMIR ENTRIZAM CALL DE  
YAZ AND HAVE HIM CONTACT OUR CHARGE IN TEHRAN SO THAT THE EXACT  
DATE FOR THE BRIEFING CAN BE SET."

ADLESICK PLANNING TDY TO STOCKHOLM AFTER DATE OF  
BRIEFING FIRMED UP. WILL DISCUSS THIS WITH STATE AFTER RECEIVING  
ORD FROM TEHRAN. WILL KEEP STATION ADVISED.

201-98254. RVN 12 AUG 98 DRV DSC 1. ALL SECRET

14 AUG 79 031647Z AUG 79 STAFF

DIRECTOR 498323.

IMMEDIATE STOCKHOLM INFO TEHRAN.

ACT STOCKHOLM.

MINTEL RYBAT AJAJA

REF: DIRECTOR 498309

IDNM: GEORGE CAVE. RVN 13 AUG 99 DRV DSC 1. ALL SECRET

SECRET

BT  
2645

32 SEP 79 14 34Z

SECRET 31 AUG 82 100 79 STAFF

STOCKHOLM 1600

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INTO TEHRAN.

UNTEL AVAJA RYBAT SDPLOD

1. ADLESICK HAD INITIAL MEETING WITH SDPLOD EVENING OF 30 AUGUST. FIRST QUESTION WAS WHY HAD SDPLOD BEEN ASSIGNED STOCKHOLM IN THE FIRST PLACE. P/1 SAID THAT HE WILL NOT EXCHANGE AMBASSADORS WITH THE U.S. IN THE NEAR FUTURE. HE WILL PROBABLY BE ASSIGNED TO WASHINGTON AS AMBASSADOR. IF THIS DOESN'T WORK OUT, HE WILL RETURN TO TEHRAN AND TAKE ANOTHER JOB WITH THE GOVERNMENT.

2. SDPLOD SAID THAT HE HAS ONLY TWO ASSIGNMENTS IN STOCKHOLM. THE FIRST IS TO REESTABLISH THE LIAISON WITH THE GOVERNMENT IN TEHRAN. HE FELT THAT IT WOULD BE EASIER TO NEGOTIATE THE ARRANGEMENTS OUTSIDE OF TEHRAN (DISCUSSIONS WILL BE SUBJECT OF SEPARATE CABLE). P/1 SAID HIS OTHER MAIN RESPONSIBILITY IS TO ATTEMPT TO GET AS MANY IRANIS AS POSSIBLE TO ACCEPT THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC AND TO IRAN. HE SPENDS MOST OF HIS TIME TRAVELLING AND SPEAKING TO LARGE GROUPS OF IRANIS.

3. QUESTIONED SDPLOD ON SHAPOUR BAKHTIAR. HE SAID ONE OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES WAS TO REPORT ON POLITICAL AMONG IRANIS. WITH REGARD TO BAKHTIAR, HE YET BEEN UNABLE TO DEVELOP ANY GOOD SOURCES. HE BELIEVES THE BAKHTIAR PHENOMENON IS MOSTLY TALK. IF THERE WAS ANY ORGANIZATION GOING ON, HE IS SURE HE WOULD HAVE HEARD OF IT (WILL INCLUDE MORE ON BAKHTIAR IN SEPARATE DISSEM.).

4. P/1 SAID THAT ONCE REACTION BACK IN CONTACT WITH HIS INTEL ROLE WILL END. BELIEVE THAT HE WOULD WELCOME CONTACT WITH REACTION AND ADLESICK WILL ASSESS WHETHER IT WOULD BE WORTHWHILE.

5. P/1 DEFER. BY 31 AUG 82 BY DPC1

SECRET

BT  
#6025

8 SEP 79 09 17Z

SECRET 061002Z SEP 79 DEFERRED TELEPOLC

CITE LONDON 17443 (SHINGLING ACTION). SECTION

TO: WASHINGTON INFO TEHRAN, STOCKHOLM.

FOR: CHIEF, NE INFO DCNE/SAO, NE/IRAN, COS, COS, STOCKHOLM

SUBJECT: UNTEL FRI AVAJA RYBAT/OPS MEETING

SDPLOD AND ADLESICK DISCUSSED THE RE ACTIVITIES ON 30 AND 31 AUGUST. AS A MEASURE THEY ATTACH TO THE RESUMPTION OF LIAISON, SDPLOD AFTER THE 30 AUGUST MEETING. SDPLOD EMPHASIS TO RESUME THE LIAISON AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND ASSESS IMPORTANCE TO OUR WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER THE LIAISON. SDPLOD UNDERSCORED HIS REMARKS: THEY FULLY REALIZED THAT IF THEY WERE GOING TO MOVING AGAIN, THEY WOULD HAVE TO TURN TO THE ASSISTANCE. THEY WERE FRANKLY CONCERNED THAT THE UNITED STATES TO DEVELOP A POSITION IN IRAN AS TO MANIPULATE THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT. I LIKE TO PROCEED AT THEIR OWN PACE AND IN SUCH NO UNDUE U.S. INFLUENCE OVER INTERNAL IRANIAN SAID THAT THE ARMS WERE GOING TO CAUSE A PROXIMATE FUTURE, AS THEY WERE UNALTERABLY OPPOSED FOREIGN INFLUENCE IN IRAN. THEY WERE ALSO UNAID THE BASIC FACT THAT IRAN WAS GOING TO NEED EXTRE ASSISTANCE IN ORDER TO CONTINUE THE DEVELOPMENT. THUS WHATEVER IS DONE WILL HAVE TO BE DONE NOW. CREATE UNDUE POLITICAL STRESS. SDPLOD POINTED OUT THE DECLINE IN CLERICAL INFLUENCE WAS PR HAZENGAH AND HE HOPED THAT IT WOULD BE ON THE V MONTHS. BUT HE CONCEDED THAT IT COULD TAKE TWO POINTED OUT THAT IF THE CLERICE WON A MAJORITY ELECTIONS, IT WOULD TAKE MUCH LONGER FOR THE GO ITSELF. SDPLOD SAID THAT THE ONE PLUS IS THE OF THE RESUMPTION OF THE LIAISON ARRANGEMENT AND NEED FOR FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.



PAGE 2 LONDON 17443 S E C R E T

2. SDPLOD/1 SAID THAT IN SEEKING TO RESUME THE RELATIONSHIP, THEY WERE HOPEFUL THAT OTHER HANDLED VIA THE LIAISON THAT WERE NOT SPECIFIC INTELLIGENCE LIAISON. SDPLOD/1 SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES TO PROVIDE GUIDANCE AND IDEAS TO HANDLE VARIOUS PROBLEMS. ADLESICK TOLD SDPLOD/1 TO DISCUSS THIS WITH INTELLIGENCE THAT THEY BEGIN A DIALOGUE WITH THE BAZERGAN DILEMMA FACING NEW GOVERNMENT IS THAT AS INDIVIDUALS WELL DISPOSED TOWARDS THE US IN GENERAL AND RELATIONSHIP, BUT ARE FACED WITH A POPULATION READY WITH

3. ADLESICK SUGGESTED THAT HE AND SDPLOD/1 OF RE-ESTABLISHING A LIAISON. THEN WE COULD GET THE APPROVAL OF OUR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS. THIS AND ADDED THAT THEY HAD ALREADY MADE THE LIAISON. ADLESICK TOLD SDPLOD/1 OF VIEW. THE LIAISON WOULD HAVE TO BE IN TEHRAN TO BE COVERT. SDPLOD/1 SAID THAT THEY HAD TO BE IN THEIR INTEREST THAT THE FACT OF THE SECRET. BAZERGAN HAD ALREADY TOLD MENDI CHAMRAN SDPLOD/1 ADDED THAT CHAMRAN HAD BEEN THE FOURTH RE AT THE BRIEFING, BUT HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO MA KURDISTAN.

4. SDPLOD/1 SAID THAT THEY HAD CONSIDERED IT AS A GOOD START. THEY HAD BEEN PLEASED WITH IT HAD ANSWERED SOME OF THE QUESTIONS THEY HAD SUBJECT MATTER BRIEFED. TOLD SDPLOD/1 THAT WE QUESTIONS PUT TO THE BRIEFER BY DR. YAZDI AND HAD NOT OF THE INTELLIGENCE THEY WERE INTERESTED IN THROUGH PROJECT IBEX. SPHINTUS ALSO HAD A SIGN HAD BEEN ALUNABLE IN THE PAST. SDPLOD/1 SAID TH IBEX BUT AS UNAWARE OF THE CAPABILITIES OF THE GAVE HIM GENERAL BRIEFING ON IBEX SYSTEM CAPAB THEN ASKED IF WE COULD PROVIDE A BRIEFING ON IBEX GUESTED THAT SDPLOD/1 AND OTHER SENIOR MEMBERS OF

PAGE 3 LONDON 17443 S E C R E T

GET A BRIEFING FROM AIRFORCE OFFICERS INVOLVED ADLESICK NAMED BG ASREJADID AS HAVING HEADED MENTIONED COL. JALALI AS BEING WELL VERSED IN ABOUT IT. ADLESICK ADDED THAT IN THIS WAY WING ANY SUSPICION ON THE PART OF THE BAZERGAN MAY WISH TO MISLEAD THEM WITH REGARD TO IBEX. ASREJADID'S NAME AND ALSO JALALI'S HE SAID T LIKE TO HAVE OUR VIEWS AS THEY WERE NOT SURE MONTHLY THE AIR FORCE ACTUALLY IS (ADLESICK TH AN INTERESTING ADMISSION). SDPLOD/1 SAID THAT TO TEHRAN FOR ANY DISCUSSIONS ON RESUMING THE NOT WANT ANYTHING TOO TECHNICAL, ALTHOUGH WITH ING BACKGROUND HE COULD UNDERSTAND TECHNICAL D WELL. HE SUGGESTED THAT ADLESICK FORWARD SUCH THROUGH COS. STOCKHOLM WHO WAS INTRODUCED TO S MEETING. RECOMMEND THAT WE SEND SDPLOD/1 BRIE IBEX CAPABILITIES. HE SAID THAT HE HAD PERSON AND BEEN INTERESTED IN THE DEDICATED COMMO THAT

5. WITH REGARD TO POSSIBLE TIMING OF HOLDING TEHRAN PROVIDING BOTH SIDES AGREE ON RE-ESTABL SOMETIME IN EARLY OCTOBER WAS AGREED UPON. WE DITUTIONS COULD BE HELD AS PART OF ANOTHER BR SAID THAT THEY WOULD APPRECIATE A BRIEFING ON O THIS COULD BE DONE. HE INSISTED THAT ADLESICK HANDLES DISCUSSION ON RESUMING LIAISON. HE POINT ADLESICK WELL KNOWN TO ALL THE PRINCIPLES IN TE SUGGESTED THAT WE BRING A TECHNICAL PERSON CAPAB ING IBEX AND THE SITES (SEE BELOW) AS THEY WOULD OUR ASSISTANCE IN CRANKING UP IBEX TO ITS CAPAB T COKE IN TERMS OF A THREE OR TWO MAN TEAM, A BR TECHNICAL EXPERT. WE AGREED THAT ON THE LIAISON MINICATE WITH HIM THROUGH COS. STOCKHOLM. SDPLO SHOULD NOTIFY HIM AT LEAST TWO WEEKS BEFORE ANY IN TEHRAN. SO THAT HE COULD CONFIRM THE TIMING A TEHRAN TO MAKE THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS. HE PO ELECTIONS COULD INTERFERE WITH TIMING OF MEETING.

6. THE AKMAN SITES WERE DISCUSSED AS PART OF ELINT CAPABILITY. ADLESICK POINTED OUT THAT AT T

850779 10 21

PAGE 4 LONDON 17443 SECRET  
THE DOWNFALL OF THE SHAH. WE WERE IN THE PROOF  
TWO ILLUMINATIONS AT SITE ONE. ADDITIONALLY, THE  
CONSIDERABLE INTELLIGENCE OF GREAT VALUE TO US  
WITH REGARD TO SOVIET CAPABILITIES. ADLESICK  
HE WOULD BE NAIVE INDEED NOT TO MENTION TO SDPL  
WE PLACED IN THE SITES AS INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION  
THAT HE KNEW THAT THE AIR GUARDING THE SITES  
THEY HAD NOT LET ANYONE INTO THEM, PENDING A  
WOULD BE DONE WITH THEM. SDPLD/1 SAID THAT SP  
FRIEND HE WOULD BE WILLING TO FUNCTION AS A FRIEND  
GETTING REACTION ACCESS TO THE SITES. HE SUGG  
VIDE HIM WITH WHATEVER BRIEFS ON THE SITES THAT  
TO THE MEETINGS IN TEHRAN. HE SAID THAT AT THE  
SPECULATE ON WHAT THE DECISION OF THE GOVERNMENT  
REGARD TO REACTION ACCESS TO THE SITES. KNOWER  
OF SDPLD/1'S BASED ON HIS ASSUMPTION SITES WOULD  
MORE, SO THERE MIGHT BE SOME ROOM FOR NEGOTIATION

7. MEETING BROKE UP ON FOND REMEMBRANCES OF  
MANY YEARS AGO. IT APPEARS THAT THE FACT THAT U  
TACTIC WITH THEM IN CONFIDENCE HAS HELPED US AND  
CON THAT THE SAZERGAN GOVERNMENT HAS APPROACHED  
TATIVELY SET UP A MEETING FOR MORNING OF 1 SEPT.  
NOTED AN INTEREST IN HIM IN THE LOBBY OF HOTEL  
DEVELOPED FROM FACT THAT SDPLD/1 HAS AN IRANIAN  
LOBBYGUARD. THEREFORE NO MEETING HELD.

8. FILE SDPLD/1 201. RVW 06 SEP 29, DAV D  
CDS COMMENT RELAYED INFO TEHRAN, STOCKHOLM PER W  
SECRET

SECRET 06 0352 SEP 29 DEFERRED TELEPOLCH  
CITE LONDON 174 62 (SHIKLING ACAUNGX)  
FROM WASHINGTON, INFO TEHRAN, STOCKHOLM.  
FOR: CHIEF, WE 2MRZ DENE/BAO, NE/IRAN, CQS, T  
COS, STOCKHOLM

SUBJECT: UNINTEL RPT RYBAT AJAJA - ADLESICK O  
MEETINGS WITH SDPLD/1

1. PERHAPS ONE MOST IMPORTANT POINT TO BE  
THEY OF MEETINGS BETWEEN SDPLD/1 AND ADLESICK  
OF RE ESTABLISHING RAPPORT. IT IS QUITE CLEAR  
COMPANY HOLD REACTION IN HIGH REGARD. THE FACT  
CONVERT CONTACT WITH REACTION AND THIS NEVER OCC  
SQUANDED HAS NO DOUBT HELPED. SDPLD/1 EMPHASIZ  
AGAIN THAT THEY WOULD LIKE TO DEAL THROUGH REAC  
TIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. AT THE SAME TIME  
CORNER ABOUT HOW WE ARE ASSESSING THE SITUATION  
MARKED ABOUT REACTION'S ABILITY TO BRING EVERYTH  
ABLE TO ASSURED HIM THAT IF THINGS CAME APART  
WE FEAR THEIR OWN MISTAKES NOT ANYTHING THAT WE

2. SDPLD/1 GAVE NUMEROUS EXAMPLES OF HOW NAIV  
MILITARILY WEAK THE GOVERNMENT IS. SENIOR OF  
TEHRAN WALKED ROUND THE CLOCK. HE SPENT FIVE DAYS  
THE LAST TRIP AND OUTSIDE OF THE BRIEFING ONLY 3  
FOR ONE HOUR. THE POLITICAL WEAKNESS OF THE GOV  
ADDED UPON INCREASED THE PERSON OF KHOMEINI. SEV  
SAID THAT HE HOPED AND PRAYED THAT NOTHING WOULD  
SDPLD/1 SAID THAT THEY NOW CONCLUDED THAT KHOME  
FOR AND RE 3 TO 5 YEARS IN ORDER TO GIVE THEM T  
DATE. HE WAS THE ONLY ONE WHO COULD STEP IN AND  
SUPPORT FOR A BILLY POLICY. HE CITED THE EXAMPL  
AND ORDERED DISCIPLINE IN THE MILITARY. SDPLD/  
KHOMEINI AS THE IMAGE IN EVERY INSTANCE WHERE HE  
ALSO SHOWED IN RATHER REVERENT TERMS. WHO KNOWS,  
MAYBE HE RETURNED.

PAGE 2 LONDON 1746Z SECRET

3. SDP/OD/1 SAID THAT KHOMEINI WAS NO PART ADVISORS IN QM. HE PRETTY MUCH KEEPS HIS OWN PROBLEM IS THAT HE IS EXPOSED TO CLERICS CONTIN THE WEEK AND IT DOES INFLUENCE HIS THINKING. HE SPEND A LOT OF TIME THINKING UP WAYS OF TRYING TO MOVE FROM QM TO TEHRAN WHERE THEY CAN GET THE INFLUENCE OF THE CLERICS AND WHERE THE GOVERNMENT MAKE EFFECTIVE USE OF HIS NATIONAL POPULARITY.

4. AT ONE POINT WE DISCUSSED THE TUDEH PARTY A MARXIST MOVEMENT GROWING IN IRAN. SDP/OD/1 I AVERAGE IRANIAN WOULD BE HARD TO ATTRACT TO TUDEH PARTY. SDP/OD/1 SAID THAT THEY FELT THAT THEIR INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO DEPT. B OF SOJANUS CONF SAID THAT THE TUDEH AND MARXISTS WERE ONLY IN A FLUCT SOMETHING BEING DONE BY OTHERS. HE GAVE THE CASE OF KHOMEINI ORDERING THE WEARING OF THE DEMONSTRATION MOUNTED BY FEMALES AGAINST THE CHAIR ITSELF WAS NOT CONNECTED TO THE MARXISTS OR THE TUDEH, BUT THEY HAD TRIED TO THE DEMONSTRATION TO GIVE IT A MARXIST CAST. SDP/OD/1 SAID THAT THEY WERE NOT CONCERNED ABOUT CURRENT CAPABILITY OF TUDEH AND MARXISTS OR THE SOVIETS ABILITY TO ENGAGE IN SUCH ACTIVITIES. SDP/OD/1 SAID THAT THEY ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE FUTURE ABILITY OF THE SOVIETS WILL BE HOSTILE TO THEM AND WORRIED ABOUT INFLUENCE OF AN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC ON THEIR BORDERS. SDP/OD/1 SAID THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ON SUCH ACTIVITIES IN IRAN.

5. SDP/OD/1 SAID THAT THERE WAS HOPE IN THE THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD RECOGNIZE THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC. ADLESICK POINTED OUT THAT WE HAD RECOGNIZED IT AND IT HAD NOT BEEN AN IMPEDENCE TO GOOD RELATIONS. ADLESICK SAID THAT HE HAD SOME CONCERN ON HIS PART THAT THE DELAY IN REASSASSORS SOMEHOW SIGNALS AMERICAN DISPLEASURE IN THE REPUBLIC. HE HOPED THAT AMBASSADORS COULD BE EXCHANGED IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

PAGE 3 LONDON 1746Z SECRET

6. SDP/UTV/1 AND OTHERS CAME UP DURING THE DISCUSSIONS. SDP/OD/1 SAID THAT HE WOULD CONTACT HE HEARS OF ANY FIRM TRAVEL PLANS FOR SDP/UTV/1.

7. OUR PARTING WAS VERY AMIABLE, AND WHAT THE FUTURE, SDP/OD/1 AGREED THAT WE SHOULD MAINTAIN CONTACT UNTIL THE LIAISON IN TEHRAN IS WELL ESTABLISHED. SDP/OD/1 AGREED. WE WILL HAVE TO LOOK INTO THE BE A GOOD IDEA TO SEE HIM ELSEWHERE IN EUROPE. SDP/OD/1 NOT HAVE TO CONTENT WITH HIS BODYGUARDS OF AT LEAST HIS IRANIAN BODYGUARD.

8. FILE: SDP/OD/1 221. RUV 06 SEP 79 DAY 005 COMMENT: RELSHED INFO TEHRAN, STOCKHOLM. SECRET



21 SEP 79 DEFERRED TELEPHONE  
 WASHINGTON 512398-  
 TEHRAN.

OM: C/ETAN  
 SUBJECT: VINITEL R/BAJ SDPLD  
 1. AS BUREAU TO IDENTIFY FOR CHANGE ON CONTINUING BASIS  
 THOSE INTEL REPORTS ACQUIRED FROM SDPLD/1. WOULD ALSO LIKE YOU  
 TO BRIEF AIM D RESULTS OF ADLESICK'S RECENT MEETINGS WITH P/1  
 S THEY PERTAIN TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTEL RELATIONSHIP  
 WITH PCO.  
 2. ADLESICK RETURNED TO WASHINGTON AFTER LAINGEN LEFT FOR  
 TEHRAN. THE FORMER WOULD LIKE LAINGEN TO KNOW WE REGRET NOT  
 HAVING BEEN ABLE TO BRIEF HIM HERE ON THE STOCKHOLM MEETINGS.  
 3. NO FILE. RVN 12SEP99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.  
 SECRET

2 SEP 79  
 SECRET 21135 2 SEP 79 SHAFI  
 CITE STOCKHOLM 26 SEP 79  
 TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INTO TEHRAN  
 UNINTEL R/BAJ SDPLD  
 REF: LONDON 17443

1. SDPLD/1 ("M. EDWARD") CALLED COS WHEN COS  
 RETURNED CALL. HE STATED HE LEAVING STOCKHOLM 5 OCTOBER FOR  
 TEHRAN AND RETURNING STOCKHOLM ON 1 OCT. BE ASKED WHETHER  
 TEHRAN BRIEFING (PARA 5 REF) COULD TAKE PLACE BEGINNING  
 6 OR 7 OCT.  
 2. COS REPLIED THAT HE HAD NOT RECEIVED WORD ON TIMING BUT  
 WOULD INQUIRE. SDPLD/1 EXPECTING REPLY NEXT WEEK. PLEASE  
 ADVISE.  
 3. FILE: 201-96254. RVN 21 SEP 99 DRV D9C.1.  
 SECRET  
 BT  
 #6199

23 SEP 79

SECRET 221719Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 519293.

TO: PRIORITY STOCKHOLM INFO TEHRAN.

WNINTEL RYBAT FGI AJAJA SDPLOD

REF: STOCKHOLM 26199

1. REQUEST COS CONTACT SDPLOD/1 AND INFORM HIM THAT WE WILL HAVE SOME DIFFICULTY MAKING DATES SUGGESTED/REF. WE WILL HAVE BRIEFINGS READY IN TIME FOR ADLESICK TO ARRIVE IN TEHRAN ON OR ABOUT 14 OCTOBER. PLEASE ASK SDPLOD/1 IF HE CAN LET ISS SCHEDULE SLIP ONE WEEK AND EMPHASIZE THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO DO MUCH BETTER GIVEN ADDITIONAL WEEK TO PREPARE.

2. FYI: IF SDPLOD/1 INSISTS ON 6-7 OCTOBER FOR BRIEFING WE PREPARED TO ATTEMPT TO ACCOMMODATE, BUT POINT OUT TO HIM ALL MATERIALS NEEDED FOR BRIEFINGS WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE/TEHRAN SOON. ADDITIONALLY, ADLESICK AND OTHER BRIEFERS HAVE COMMITTED MAKING IT DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO ARRIVE IN TEHRAN ON 5 OCTOBER.

3. PLEASE ADVISE SDPLOD/1 REPLY ON PRIORITY BASIS.

4. FILE: 201-962054. RTW 22 SEP 99 DRV D9C.1 ALL

SECRET  
BT  
#5532

25 SEP 79

SECRET 230908Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE STOCKHOLM 26210

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.

WNINTEL RYBAT FGI AJAJA SDPLOD


REFS: A. STOCKHOLM 26199  
B. DIRECTOR 519293

1. AFTER SOME PERSUASION, SDPLOD/1 AGREES TO DELAY BRIEFING UNTIL 14 OCTOBER SO AS TO GET MORE COMPLETE AND THOROUGH PRESENTATION. COS TOLD HIM WE WOULD CONFIRM DATE.

2. PLEASE ADVISE WHEN DATE FIRM.

3. FILE: 201-962054. RTW 25 SEP 99 DRV D9C.1 ALL  
SECRET

1. 100 R T 021453Z OCT 79 STAFF 3 OCT 79  
 000 STOCKHOLM 00204  
 000 PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY TERRY  
 000 TEL RYBAT FGI AJAJ SDPL00  
 REF: 1. DIRECTOR 524422  
 BY DIRECTOR 520197  
 1. SDPL00/1 SAID BRIDINGS STILL ON AND HE HAD NO INFO FROM  
 TERRY WHICH WOULD CHANGE THIS CONCLUSION. AS USUAL, HE LEAS  
 AND POLICE ON PHONE.  
 2. HE THOUGHT THERE NO PROBLEM GETTING VISAS IN WASHINGTON. A  
 CROUCH IT OBTAIN VISAS HERE THROUGH HIM. IF ALEX SICK AND R.  
 SMITH INTEND GET VISAS HERE, WE MUST NOW BY OPENING OF BUSTLE  
 FRIDAY, 5 OCTOBER BECAUSE SDPL00/1 DEPARTING STOCKHOLM FOR PARIS  
 MONDAY, 6 OCTOBER. HE WOULD HAVE TO LEAVE INSTRUCTIONS RE VISAS. HE DID  
 NOT THINK IT NECESSARY FOR ALEXSICK TO COMPEL WITH HIM FARE  
 BEFORE TERRY MEETING.  
 3. SDPL00/1 DEPARTING PARIS FOR STOCKHOLM ON 8 OCT 2 OCTOBER.  
 THEREFORE WANTS TERRY MEETING TO BE HELD 10 OCTOBER AT  
 LATEST TO AVOID WASTING HIS TIME IN TERRY.  
 4. IF MATERIAL IN RM NO. 507785 (REF B) ARRIVES STOCKHOLM  
 FRIDAY 5 OCTOBER, SHOULD AT 1000 HRS. DEFER TO HIS FOR SECURITY  
 INSTRUCTIONS SINCE SDPL00/1 PRESUMABLY WILL ENTER LEAVE  
 OFFICE OF DIRECTOR 11 WITH HIM TO PARIS. IF YOU PREFER  
 MESSAGE, I COULD BE GIVE HIM ANY SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS RE HANDLING  
 FIDE: 201-052054. RVM 020CT99 RRV DGC.1  
 S E E T  
 #620





Real Name: Bahram Bahramian.

Code Name: S. D. Arne/1.

According to the documents of the C. I. A., Bahramian was a member of the High Command of the Liberation Movement Organization and a friend of Bazargan. In June 1977 he was employed by the C. I. A. as a single channel of information for passing secrets about the so-called terrorist activities and about the opponents of the regime in Iran. In the beginning this co-operation with the C. I. A. was based on the understanding that he would pass word to the U. S. government about the views of his moderate political party through a certain channel with the hope that the U. S. government would do something for his party as a result of these contacts and for his support to the government of the Shah. He was of course prohibited from disclosing to his colleagues anything about his contacts with the C. I. A. After the Revolution, he desired to promote a perfectly open system in Iran and had the feeling that the U. S. government could play a significant role in this regard. For a long time he refused to accept any salary, but after Khurdad (June) he signed a memorandum of commitment and agreed to receive a salary, according to which the C. I. A. had to pay the instalments of his life insurance policy -- an amount equivalent to \$100000 and to deposit \$5000 annually in an indirect bank account. He was given the legal status of a permanent resident of America, and he was promised that he and his family would be given the above mentioned legal status as long as they stayed abroad.

Bahramian was given training in code-writing, code-telecommunication and security system. He possessed wireless transmitter Mx-350, through which the incharge of the C. I. A. station made contacts with him and asked for his help during the Bahman 58 (January 1979), siege of the embassy, after which he informed Yazdi about it. Afterwards the transmitter was taken from him by the C. I. A. and he was given lie-detection tests which he successfully passed.

His principal reports were about the leadership of the provisional

government, Revolutionary Council and the clergy, which were of extreme value to the C. I. A., and he often gained very high marks for his reports. He was the source of information for 67 reports from Dey 57 (December 1978) to Shahrivar 58 (September 1979).

In Bahramian's file, several documents are concerned with the determination of an operational address in England for his use. These documents also indicate that as conditions in Iran worsened the C. I. A. did not find any other means to contact Bahramian except personally receiving information from him in Iran. In order to retain this connection they assigned one of their agents to receive reports from Bahramian, which could be sent under confidential cover by ordinary mail. The name and address of the agent could be seen on the documents.

Afterwards some changes were made regarding the maintenance and care of those technical instruments of communication that were in Bahramian's charge. Subsequently there are certain documents at the end of the file regarding the plans of his possible secret flight from Iran and other such activities for which the C. I. A. had prepared the forged documents for Bahramian in advance.

It is worth mentioning here that the documents related to the Liberation Movement Organization (document 9: book 24.) give an account of the meeting that Muhammad Tawassuli of the Liberation Movement had in the company of one of the officials of the political section of the Espionage Den with this spy (Bahram Bahramian), that was held on Mehr 3, 57 (September 25, 1978). It was he who arranged this meeting on behalf of the Liberation Movement along with Muhammad Tawassuli.

S E C R E T 260716Z MAR 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 52508 (PLANTINGA ACTING)

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT PLSDURN

1. SDURN/1 (U/I) PASSED US RIALS 500,000 ON 25 MARCH 79, WITH A REQUEST THAT THIS AMOUNT BE CONVERTED INTO US DOLLARS AND DEPOSITED IN HIS IDEN ACCOUNT.

2. U/I REQUIRES THE FUNDS AS HIS WIFE HAS BEEN ILL AND WILL TRAVEL TO THE U.S. FOR SURGERY IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS.

3. REQUEST HQS APPROVAL CONVERT ABOVE SUM INTO DOLLARS, AND HQS ASSISTANCE IN ARRANGING DEPOSIT DOLLARS INTO IDEN ACCOUNT. FYI, EMBASSY IS CONVERTING RIALS TO DOLLARS AT RATE OF RIALS 74.5 TO U.S. \$1. WHILE THIS IS A DIFFERENT RATE THAN KIAJIUN IS BUYING AT, REQUEST THIS RATE BE USED. IF RTACTION INCURRS A LOSS IN MAKING THIS ACCOMODATION CONVERSION, SUGGEST LOSS, IF NECESSARY, BE RECOVERED FROM FUNDS WE ARE "PAYING" TO U/I.

4. PLS ADVISE IF ACCOMODATION APPROVED, AND DATE CHECK MAILED TO IDEN SO THAT WE MAY INFORM SDURN/1 THAT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE.

5. FILE: DEFER. RVW 26MAR99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.  
S E C R E T

S E C R E T 260716Z MAR 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 52509 (PLANTINGA ACTING)

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT PLSDURN

REF: TEHRAN 52508

IDEN: ACCOUNT NO. 09-13301-7  
FIRST NATIONAL BANK  
TOWN AND COUNTRY OFFICE  
FAR HILLS AVENUE  
DAYTON  
OHIO  
45429  
(SAVINGS ACCOUNT)

RVW 26MAR99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.  
S E C R E T

1 Apr 79

SECRET 041704Z APR 79 STAFF  
CITE LONDON 13151

TO: DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN, ATTECH, DIRTECH.  
WHINTEL RYBAT PLSDURN TECHS

REF: DIRECTOR 405437

1. WE HAVE RECENTLY OFFERED AN A/A FOR USE FROM LIBYA BY  
ANOTHER NEAR EAST ASSET (ACWIZARD/1) (SEE LONDON 12969 TO DIRTECH  
AND DIRTECH).

2. ACWIZARD/1 WILL BE TESTING THIS A/A IN COMING WEEKS AND  
WE WILL HAVE CHANCE TO SEE HOW WELL IT WORKS. ACWIZARD/1 WILL  
USING ADDRESS REGULARLY AND FREQUENTLY WHILE UNDERSTAND THAT  
SDURN/1 WILL BE USING ONLY ON A WORST CASE BASIS. THEREFORE, IN  
JUDGMENT IS THAT A/A SHOULD BE ABLE TO HANDLE BOTH AGENTS UNDER  
THESE CIRCUMSTANCES.

3. WE ARE CHECKING INTO POSSIBILITY OF GETTING POST OFFICE BOX  
USE AS A/A, BUT THIS STILL NOT ACCOMPLISHED. SUGGEST THAT SAME  
ADDRESS GIVEN ACWIZARD/1 BE GIVEN TO SDURN/1.

FILE: 201-949163, RVW 24 APR 79  
SECRET

7 Apr 79: 02 242

SECRET 002000Z APR 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 414400.

TO: LONDON INFO TEHRAN, ATTECH, DIRTECH.

WHINTEL RYBAT PLSDURN TECHS

REF: LONDON 13151

1. HAVE NO OBJECTION TO UTILIZATION OF SAME A/A FOR SDURN  
AND ACWIZARD/1. SUGGEST THAT NAME GIVEN SDURN/1 SHOULD BE  
DIFFERENT FROM, OR VARIANT OF, NAME GIVEN ACWIZARD/1. PLEASE  
ADVISE.

2. APPRECIATE YOUR ASSISTANCE IN THIS MATTER.

3. FILE: 201-949163, RVW 24 APR 79 DGC.1 ALL SECRET.

SECRET  
BT  
#2772

9 APR 79 17 19Z

SECRET 091739Z APR 79 STAFF

CITE LONDON 13295

TO: DIRECTOR, INFO TEHRAN, ATATECH, DIRTECH.

UNINTEL RYBAT PLS DURN TECHS

REF: DIRECTOR 414499

1. RECOGNIZING PRINCIPLE IN QUESTION, FROM OUR VIEWPOINT, WOULD NEVERTHELESS OPT FOR USING SAME NAME. ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF DOING SO LIES ONLY IN HOPE THAT NAME WILL BECOME FAMILIAR TO POSTMAN, FURTHER SUPPORTING NORMAL LOCAL PRACTICE OF DELIVERING MAIL TO ADDRESS RATHER THAN TO NAME OF KNOWN OCCUPANT. WE WOULD HOPE THAT MAIL FROM IRAN WOULD DISTRACT ATTENTION FROM MAIL FROM LIBYA AND VICEVERSA. USE OF DIFFERENT NAMES COULD LEAD POSTMAN TO WONDER HOW MANY PEOPLE HE HASN'T SEEN ACTUALLY LIVE THERE. WE FORESEE NO PROBLEM WITH JUST ONE. (WE PLAN MAYBE PERIODIC MAILINGS OF LETTERS FROM PARTS OF U.K. AND OTHER COUNTRIES, AS CHANCES PRESENT THEMSELVES, TO FURTHER OBFUSCATE MATTER.)

2. UNLESS HQS THINKS POSSIBILITY OF ONE SOURCE'S BECOMING FLOWN WITH RESULTANT PUBLICITY INCLUDING NAME AND ADDRESS OF A/A, IS RATHER GREATER THAN WHAT WE SEE AS ADDED SECURITY AT THIS END, SUGGEST THAT NAME ISSUED TO HQS/VI BE SAME SURNAME, BUT WITH FIRST NAME LIKE "JOHN" OR "JAMES" INSTEAD OF INITIAL ONLY USED BY AOWIZARDAL.

3. THIS IS TEHRAN/HQS OR. DEFER FOR FINAL DECISION TO YOU, PLS ADVISE.

4. FILE: 201-949163. RVW 9 APR 79 DRV D9C.1.

SECRET

*My action*

12 APR 79 15 46Z

SECRET 121355Z APR 79 SFF

CITE LONDON 13425

TO: DIRECTOR, TEHRAN INFO DTECH, ATATECH.

UNINTEL RYBAT PLS DURN TECHS

REF: DIRECTOR 417068

1. SUGGEST INDICATOR OF PRESENCE OF SW MESSAGE WOULD BE USE OF INITIAL "S."

2. TEHRAN: ADDRESS WHICH MAY BE GIVEN SDURN IS IDENT.

3. FILE: 201-949163. RVW 12 APR 79 DRV D9C.1.

SECRET

*W-1 G*



11 APR 79 16 32Z

SECRET 11 1512Z APR 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 42066L

TO: LONDON INFO TEHRAN, AT TEHRAN DIRTECH.

UNINTL RYBAT PLSDUR TECHS

REF: LONDON 11 2205

1. WE AGREE WITH YOUR THINKING AND CONCUR IN SUGGESTION THAT AME ISSUE SDURN/1 RE SAF SURNAME, BUT WITH FIRST NAME "JAMES" WRITTEN OUT INSTEAD OF INITIAL "J" ONLY, WHICH USED BY ACWIZARD/1. ONE THOUGHT HAS BEEN TO AVOID CONFUSION BETWEEN MAIL SENT BY ACWIZARD/1 AND THAT SENT BY SDURN/1 IN EVENT POST MARKS WERE OBSERVED, OR BOTH CASES HAPPENED MAIL LETTERS FROM SAF LOCALE. AS ACWIZARD/1 HAS NO SW INDICATORS OTHER THAN ADDRESS, PERHAPS ADDITIONAL SW INDICATOR SHOULD BE GIVEN SDURN/1.

2. FILE: 201-949163. 1 MAY 10 APR 79 DRV DSC.1. ALL SECRET

MAY 79 12

SECRET 302158Z APR 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 42066L

TO: TEHRAN

UNINTL PLSDUR

REF: TEHRAN 52718

1. NOTHING FURTHER DESIRED OF STATION OF SDURN/1 TO ENTER THE APPLICATION FOR PRESERVATION OF RESIDENCE AND NATURALIZATION. WHEN WE RECEIVE APPLICATION FORM, WILL FORWARD IT WITH INFO TO HGS ALLEN AFFAIRS OFFICE REQUESTING THEY TAKE ACTION TO OBTAIN APPROVAL FROM INS TO PROVIDE SDURN/1 WITH APPROPRIATE BENEFITS. WILL ADVISE WHEN INS APPROVAL RECEIVED.

2. FILE: 201-949163. 1 MAY 30 APR 1979 DRV DSC.1. ALL SECRET  
SECRET  
12  
43233



SECRET 131058Z JUN 79 STAFF  
CITE HRTIAN 53436 (GLEBOROFF ACTING)  
TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR  
WINTEL SELDURN INTEL

REF: EM TRAN 53434 (NIT-12,643)

1. SDURN/I ACQUIRED INFO PARAS TWO-THREE REF FROM BAZARGAN, AND IC MPARA FOUR FROM MUSTAFA CHAHRAH.

2. AT MEETING AT WHICH REF ACQUIRED, SDURN/I WAS MORE GLOOMY THAN WE HAVE MET SEEN HIM ON THE FUTURE OF IRAN'S REVOLUTION. U/I APPEARS PERSONALLY VERY FATIGUED AND FRUSTRATED, WORKING LONG HOURS TO COME UP WITH PROGRAMS AND COURSES OF ACTION WHICH HE SEES AS PROPER AND REALISTIC, ONLY TO FIND SUCH HARD WORK UNDONE (OR AT LEAST SET BACK) BY A SINGLE UTTERANCE FROM KHOMEINI AND/OR THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. WE HAVE FOUND U/I INCREASINGLY CYNICAL. ALL THIS HAS AFFECTED HIS PRODUCTION, SINCE HE HAS LESS TIME NOW TO SPEND WITH US AND TENDS NOT TO BELIEVE THAT MUCH OF WHAT GOES ON IS OF ANY REAL SIGNIFICANCE.

3. U/I IS A "BIG-PICTURE" MAN, AND IS MOST AT HOME WITH SITUATIONS SUCH AS WERE OCCURRING LAST FALL AND WINTER WHEN HIS COOPERATION WITH STATION WAS SIGNIFICANT IN A POLITICAL ACTION CONTEST. AT THAT TIME HE WAS DEPRESSED BY INDICATIONS THAT THE USG IS NOT INCLUDING NEYO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH REVOLUTIONARY IRAN. HE IS ESPECIALLY DISTRESSED BY OUR RELUCTANCE TO SEND A SPECIAL ENVOY TO KHOMEINI. HE NOW IS BEGINNING TO WONDER, WE THINK, HOW USEFUL A ROLE HE IS PLAYING IN HIS COOPERATION WITH US. HE NONETHELESS ACCEPTED CONTACT PLAN FOR MEETING NEW CASE OFFICER EARLY JULY (SEE SEPARATE CABLE) AND GIVES NO INDICATION YET THAT HE IS GOING TO BAIL OUT. U/I IS AN EXTREMELY BRIGHT MAN, BUT AS ESSENTIALLY A VISIONARY HE IS BECOMING VERY IMPATIENT WITH THE RIGIDITY OF SOME OF THE DOGMATICS HE MUST WORK WITH.

4. FILE: 201-949163. RW 13 JUN 99 DRV DS C.I. ALL SECRET.

SECRET

SECRET 141241Z JUN 79 STAFF  
CITE TENRAM 53449 (GLEGOROFF ACTING)  
TO: DIRECTOR  
WINTEL RYBAT PLSDURN

1. FOLLOWING IS RECONTACT PLAN FOR SDURN/I.

A. DURING FIRST WEEK JULY, PAQUIN CAN CALL SDURN/I AT IDENT OR IDENT B PHONE NUMBERS, IDENTIFYING HIMSELF AS FRIEND OF MR. WILLIAMS. HE CAN MENTION CONTRACTS FOR MOBILE RENTAL HOSPITALS, AND SUGGEST MEETING. WHATEVER DAY AGREED UPON, PAQUIN SHOULD BE WALKING NORTH ON STREET NEAR VENETTO PIZZA RESTAURANT PERPENDICULAR WEMH-E-SHAH STREET. MAP OF LOCATION IS IN SDURN/I FILE. U/I WILL PICK PAQUIN UP IN LIGHT GREEN VW (ONE OF THE VERY FEW OF ITS KIND IN TOWN). TIME OF MEETING IS 2030.

B. IF U/I WISHES TO MAKE CONTACT FIRST, HE WILL CALL EMBASSY EXTENSION 1113 OR 1115 AND ASK TO SPEAK TO "TOM". HE WILL IDENTIFY SELF AS "BRIAN". REMAINDER OF PARA 1A ARRANGEMENT IS THE SAME.

2. FILE: 201-949163. RW 9 JUN 99 DRV DS C.I. ALL SECRET.

SECRET



SECRET 141041Z JUN 79 STAFF  
 CITE TEHRAN 53450 (GLEBOROFF ACTING)  
 TO: DIRECTOR  
 MIN EL RYBAT PLSDURN  
 REF: TEHRAN 53449

1. IDEN 9 IS 247-214 RPT 247-214 (HOME PHO)  
 IDEN 8 IS 841162 RPT 841162 (OFFICE PHO)  
 2. FILE: 201-949163. RW 9 JUN 95 (DRM DS) ALL SECRET  
 SECRET

2 JUN 79 01 58z

SECRET 211953Z JUN 79 STAFF

CITE DIRTECH 52614

TO: TEHRAN INFO ATHTECH DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL AQUATIC EZRALLY EZGOODS

REF: TEHRAN 53277

RE PARA 3 REF, RECOMMEND THAT STATION RETAIN SV/A-8  
S/N 619, SV-8 S/N 429 AND SV-8 S/N 341 ALL ON 170.632  
RPT 170.330 KHZ FOR SDURN/1 CONTINGENCY. RETURN ALL  
OTHER UNITS HQS FIA FASTACT CHANNELS. RVW 1 JUN 99  
DRV C9C.1.8 BY 198-103  
SECRET

✓  
Bill-Jerry

SECRET 140733Z JUL 79 TELPOUCH

CITE TEHRAN 53680

TO: WASHINGTON.

FROM: C/NE/TRAN INFO DC/NE/AD

SUBJECT: WNINTEL--CONTACT WITH SDURN/1

REF: TEHRAN 53670

1. REACHED SDURN/1 FROM PAY PHONE EARLY EVENING 13 JULY.  
DESPITE ITS BEING HOLIDAY, TRAFFIC NOISE INTERFERED WITH COMMUN-  
ICATIONS, BUT WE UNDERSTOOD U/I TO SAY THAT HE STILL PREOCCUPIED WITH  
COMPLICATED BUSINESS TRANSACTION OF SOME SORT. HE CLAIMED THE MATTER  
TOO COMPLICATED TO EXPLAIN, AND SAID HE WILL CALL US NEXT WEEK.  
WE SAID WE VERY INTERESTED IN SEEING HIM, AND GOT HIS ASSURANCE THAT  
HE STILL HAS OUR PHONE NUMBER. U/I'S TONE WAS BUSINESSLIKE BUT  
PLEASANT; IT GAVE NO CLUE AS TO REASON FOR HIS RECENT  
UNAVAILABILITY, OR HIS INTENTIONS REGARDING FUTURE CONTACT.

2. WILL KEEP HQS ADVISED.

3. FILE: 201-949163. RVW 14 JUL 99 DRV D9C.1. CL BY 015356.  
ALL SECRET  
SECRET

SECRET 251845Z JUN 79

25 JUN 79

CITE DIRTECH 53062

TO: TEHRAN INFO ATATECH, DIRECTOR, HEARAZING  
MINTEL AQUATIC EZZALLY SDURN

REFS: A. TEHRAN 52313 (NOTAL)  
B. DIRECTOR 396574 (NOTAL)

1. REF A INDICATED SDURN/1 MAY-55 DVP RETRI  
HQS UNABLE LOCATE REPLY TO REF B. QUERY WHETHER  
BATTERY CHARGER CONCEALED IN SANYO STEREO STILL  
2. IN VIEW OF SUBSEQUENT CONTINGENCY, REQUIR  
SVAN-8 FOR SDURN/1 PLEASE ADVISE IF REF B CONC  
BATTERY CHARGER STILL REQUIRED.  
RVM 20 JUN 79 DRV CSC1.8 BY 196/33.  
SECRET

SECRET 311446Z AUG 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE WASHINGTON 505692.

TO: TEHRAN.

FROM: ONE/IRAN

SUBJECT: MINTEL MISDEEM JECENT

REF: TEHRAN 54055

1. GLAD TO SEE FACE TO FACE CONTACT HAS BEEN REESTABLISHED  
WITH SDURN/1 (U/L) PER REF.

2. WE HAVE TWO ADMINISTRATIVE ITEMS WHICH WILL EVENTUALLY  
REQUIRE U/L'S SIGNATURE IN ORDER TO COMPLETE HIS INSURANCE AND  
TAX RECORDS:

A. A SIGNED CERTIFICATION (WHICH STATION MAY DRAW UP)  
STATING BRIEFLY THAT U/L UNDERSTANDS THAT NO FEDERAL OR  
STATE OR SOCIAL SECURITY TAXES WILL BE WITHHELD FROM HIS  
REACTION COMPENSATION AND THAT HE WILL NOT ACCRUE ANY SOCIAL  
SECURITY CREDITS DURING THIS PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT. THIS  
CERTIFICATION SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO HQS FOR RETENTION  
SHOULD ANY QUESTIONS ARISE AS TO HIS COMPLIANCE WITH THE IRS  
REGULATIONS WITH REGARD TO HIS REACTION COMPENSATION.

B. SDURN/1'S INSURANCE POLICY BENEFICIARY DESIGNATION.  
THIS WILL REQUIRE BOTH HIS SIGNATURE AND NAMES OF HIS  
DESIGNATED PRIMARY AND CONTINGENCY BENEFICIARIES.

3. WE HAVE DEFERRED POUCHING STATION ITEM (B) IN VIEW OF  
THE CONTINUING RISKS INVOLVED IN KEEPING U/L COMBINED WITH THE  
RATHER INCRIMINATING NATURE OF THE DOCUMENTS THEMSELVES. SOLICIT  
STATION VIEWS ON FEASIBILITY OF ATTEMPTING TO ACQUIRE SIGNATURES  
IN THE NEAR FUTURE. IF RESPONSE POSITIVE, WILL POUCH ITEM (B),  
BUT IF ANY DOUBTS EXIST, WE CAN AND WILL CONTINUE TO DEFER  
THIS.

PAGE 2 WASHINGTON 525892 S E C R E T  
 A. FILE: 201-249153. RVW 50AUG99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET  
 S E C R E T  
 BT  
 #7482

6 Sep 79 04 06Z

S E C R E T 051331Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE FRANKFORT 72861

TO: TEHRAN INFO DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL LOGS TECHS 8DURN

REFS: A. TEHRAN 51290  
 B. TEHRAN 51625  
 C. TEHRAN 51120

REF C RAPIDOPRINT ACTIVATOR WAS ORDERED BY YOUR STATION  
 VIA REF A ON 25 JAN 79. BECAUSE OF EARLIER DIFFICULTIES IN  
 DELIVERING MATERIAL TO YOUR AREA, IT WAS NOT SHIPPED UNTIL ONLY  
 RECENTLY. PER REF, THE ACTIVATOR IS FOR USE WITH YOUR ZOTORI  
 RAPID PROCESSOR MBL 1494D. WE CANNOT PROVIDE ANY FURTHER BACK-  
 GROUND. RVW 24SEP99, DRV D9C.3.

S E C R E T  
 BT  
 #2351



6 SEP 79

MEMO FOR: SPURN/1 5912

SUBJECT: Contact Arrangement

1. MEETING to be arranged on phone. U/1 will call 11:35 AM.

2. ask for Tom. Date and time agreed on phone will schedule.

3. Site: 6 St. Dunstons St. (over Asadana St. and vertical to it).

4. I will walk north, U/1 will walk North wall. I will pick him up.

C/O

5 SEP 79

SECRET

TO: A-100000-22225

FROM: NE/IRAN

SUBJECT: UNINTEL - SPURN/1 5912

FOLLOWING IS OUR SUGGESTED PLAN FOR SPURN/1 OR REPORTING PERIOD APR 79 - OCT 79. PLEASE MAKE ANY COMMENT OR CORRECTIONS YOU FEEL APPROPRIATE, AND PLEASE SUPPLY LINED REVISIONS SO FEARS CAN BE COMPLETED.

REPORTING PERIOD: APRIL 79 - OCTOBER 79

1. IDENTIFICATION:

A. SPURN

B. DISSENT - FILE: 721-2549173

2. NAME: 2549173

3. OBJECTIVE: S

4. OPERATIONAL DATA:

A. OPERATIONAL ASSIGNMENT AND AUTHORIZATIONS/CLEARANCES: PUSHDAN 1 IS AN IRANIAN CITIZEN RESIDENT IN TEHRAN WHO HOLDS U.S. PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN STATUS. HE IS A CONSIDERATE MODERATE LEADER AND LONG TERM OPPONENTS OF THE SHAH AND ARE NOW SENIOR FIGURES IN THE EGOI. AND HE REPORTS ON THEIR VIEWS AND ON INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS GENERALLY. BOA WAS GRANTED 12 JUNE 77 AND ON GRANTED 27 MARCH 79.

B. U/1'S ACCESS TO THE CURRENT LEADERS OF THE EGOI IS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE IN WORKING AGAINST THIS TARGET.

C. CONTROL AND COMMITMENTS: U/1 ORIGINALLY COMPEL THE EGOI IN ORDER TO ACQUIRE A CHANNEL FOR HIS MODERATE POLITICAL GROUP'S VIEWS TO THE U.S. WITH THE HOPE THAT US WOULD EVENTUALLY MOVE TO OPEN CONTACT AND SUPPORT FOR THIS





REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WNINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT--ORCON

COUNTRY: IRAN

SUBJECT: EFFORT BY GROUP INCLUDING AYATOLLAH TALEGHANI TO MERGE RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR AUTHORITY IN A NEW PROVISIONAL REGIME (DOI: LATE AUGUST 1979)

SOURCE : A CONFIDANT OF A SENIOR MEMBER OF AN IRANIAN POLITICAL ORGANIZATION WHO HAS BEEN INTIMATELY INVOLVED IN THE PROCESS OF THE REVOLUTION IN IRAN AND WHO HAS HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS IN THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN. HIS PAST REPORTING HAS BEEN GENERALLY SUBSTANTIATED.

1. A NON-GOVERNMENT GROUP HAS BEEN TRYING TO PERSUADE PRIME MINISTER MEHDI B A Z A R G A N TO ENDORSE A PLAN WHICH WOULD COMBINE THE SECULAR AUTHORITY, REPRESENTED BY THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT, AND THE RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY AS PERSONIFIED BY AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH K H O M E I N I. THE MEMBERS OF THE GROUP, WHO INCLUDE AYATOLLAH SAYAD MAHMUD T A L E G H A N I, ABDOL B A N I - S A D R, AND EZZED S A H A B I, BELIEVE THAT THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF PARALLEL LINES OF AUTHORITY IS INCAPABLE OF DEALING WITH URGENT PROBLEMS, THAT BAZARGAN IS UNWILLING EVEN TO CONFRONT THESE PROBLEMS, AND THAT KHOMEINI'S PERSONAL AUTHORITY MUST BE MERGED INTO UNIFIED PROVISIONAL GOVERNING STRUCTURE. BAZARGAN, WHO PERCEIVES HIS ROLE AS LIMITED TO PRESIDING OVER THE TRANSFER OF A .....-CONSTITUTED GOVERNMENT, HAS BEEN UNWILLING TO SUPPORT THE PROPOSAL, DESPITE HIS CLOSE PERSONAL LINKS TO THE MEMBERS OF THE SPONSORING GROUP. IF HE DOES NOT CHANGE HIS MIND DURING THE WEEK OF 26 AUGUST, AND THERE IS LITTLE HOPE THAT HE WILL, TALEGHANI WILL VISIT QOM OVER THE WEEKEND TO SOLICIT KHOMEINI'S AGREEMENT.

2. THE PROVISIONAL STRUCTURE ENVISIONED BY THE SPONSORING GROUP WOULD HAVE KHOMEINI AS CHAIRMAN OF A GOVERNING "BOARD". BAZARGAN WOULD BE A MEMBER, WHILE SERVING AS THE NEW STRUCTURE'S "SECRETARY GENERAL." ALL OF THE MEMBERS OF THE PRESENT CABINET WOULD BE DISMISSED, AND THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL DISSOLVED, AND OFFICIALS, SUBORDINATE TO THE GOVERNING BOARD, WOULD BE ASSIGNED FUNCTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES SUCH AS DEFENSE, AGRICULTURE, HOUSING

160616Z SEP 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

REF ID: A54222

WASHINGTON.

IRAN

CT: UNINTEL--SOURNA: FSAR

WASHINGTON 512806

1. FOLLOWING DATA KEYED TO REF:

A.D. U/I IS MET FOR CAR PICKUPS, USING EITHER HIS CAR THAT OF C/O, AS PRE-ARRANGED. SIGNAL FOR MEETING CAN BE INITIATED BY PHONE BY EITHER PARTY.

A.E. NO SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS HAVE ARISEN SINCE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF CONTACT IN AUGUST 79.

A.F. THERE ARE NO PRESENT PLANS FOR FURTHER TRAINING.

B. STATION PLANS FOR THE EXPLOITATION OF U/I REFLECT THE TENDENCY OF THE TWO PARALLEL POWER STRUCTURES TO MERGE; WE WILL EMPHASIZE REPORTING ON THE RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP AND HIS ROLE IN DETERMINING THE ORIENTATION OF THE REGIM AND OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT.

6.A. ONE EXPENSES IN USD 200

6.C. ONE TENTH.

2. FILES 201-6549163. 16 SEP 79 DIV DSC.I. ALL SECRET

27 SEP 79 04 19z

SECRET 262220Z SEP 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE WASHINGTON 521568.

TO: TEHRAN.

FROM: NE/IRAN/R INFO DCNE/SAO; NE/INTEL; DPDS/EG/DDO/CS

SUBJECT: WNINTEL - GRADES AND COMMENTS FOR REPORTS.

1. FOLLOWING ARE THE GRADES AND COMMENTS FOR AUGUST:  
NIT'S 10,700; 10,701; 10,704; 10,707; 10,708 AND 10,709.  
REVIEWED 25 SEPTEMBER 1979. REMAINING AUGUST NIT'S ARE OIL  
REPORTS WHICH NE/ECON WILL GRADE SEPARATELY.

OBJ: S.I.B.

NIT-10,704 SDURN

TDFIRDB-315/15168-79 RATING: 5  
29 AUGUST 1979

UNILATERAL SDURN/1

FULL

SUBJECT: EFFORT BY GROUP INCLUDING AYATOLLAH TALEGHANI TO MERGE  
RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR AUTHORITY IN A NEW PROVISIONAL  
REGIME.

COMMENT: REPORT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN SOMEWHAT SUBSTANTIATED IN  
THE PRESS. LATER REPORTING INDICATED THIS GROUP'S PROPOSALS HAD  
BEEN TURNED DOWN. ANALYSTS REMAIN VERY INTERESTED IN MOVES BY  
THE CLERGY TOWARD A MORE ACTIVE GOVERNING ROLE. THERE IS GREAT  
INTEREST IN ANY REPORTING ON THE VIEWS OF THE IRANIAN CLERGY -  
ANY OF THEM. REPORT WAS USED IN ACSI BRIEF.

SECRET 271025Z SEP 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE TEHRAN 34326

TO: WASHINGTON.

FROM: C/NE/IRAN

WNINTEL PLSDURN

IT WILL NOT HAVE ESCAPED YOU THAT SDURN/1 HAS NOT  
MADE ANY RECENT CONTRIBUTION TO OUR UNDERSTANDING OF  
GOVERNMENT DYNAMICS, INCLUDING THE NAZIN AFFAIR. AT  
LAST MEETING WE CONSENTED TO U/I REQUEST THAT NEXT MEETING  
BE INITIATED BY HIS PHONE CALL. HAVE NOT HEARD FROM HIM.  
AND OVER LAST THREE DAYS HAVE LEFT MESSAGES AT BOTH HOME  
AND OFFICE ASKING HIM TO GET IN TOUCH. WILL ADVISE RESULTS.

FILE: 201-349163. RNV 27 SEP 93 DRV D9C.1. ALL

SECRET  
SECRET

136

57

SECRET 05084

CITE TEHRAN 54412

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

VNINTEL RYBAT AJAJA PLSDURN FJ

PERS: A. DIRECTOR 526966

B. DIRECTOR 526974

1. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION IS CORRECT,  
AS DARK BROWN RATHER THAN BLACK. GLASSES  
"PCRC" TYPE.

2. FILE: 201-949163, PVW 650CT99 DRV D9C.1.

SECRET

50 OCT 28 05 47Z

SECRET 052125Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE DIRTECH 54895

TO: IMMEDIATE TEHRAN INFO IMMEDIATE FRANTECH, DIRECTOR.

RYBAT LFGAMIN AJAJA PLSDURN SUPASTIME TECHS

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 526966

B. TEHRAN 54412

1. FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE SUBMITTED SINCE THERE IS POSSIBILITY  
ALIAS DOCUMENTS MAY BE REQUIRED FOR INFILTRATION (SDURN/1).

2. REVIEW OF HIS PASSPORT ISSUANCE CAPABILITIES IN SEARCH OF  
NATIONALITY THAT WOULD BE PLAUSIBLE FOR SDURN/1. CONCERNING RACIAL  
FEATURES, LANGUAGE KNOWLEDGE, VISA REQUIREMENTS FOR ENTERING IRAN AND  
FOR ONWARD TRAVEL, MAKES PORTUGUESE PASSPORT ISSUED IN MACAO SEEM  
MOST DESIRABLE. ALL LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES' PASSPORTS REQUIRE VISA.  
ONE COUNTRY'S PPTS AVAILABLE WOULD REQUIRE IRANIAN VISA, EXCEPT  
TUNISIA, WHICH NOT CONSIDERED ACCEPTABLE BECAUSE SUBJECT DOES NOT  
SPEAK FRENCH. MUJATT PPT CONSIDERED, BUT VISA REQUIREMENT AND  
POSSIBLE ONWARD TRAVEL FROM IRAN TO MUJATT MAY MAKE THIS PORT CHOICE

3. PROPOSE COVER LEGEND OF PORTUGUESE BUSINESSMAN RESIDING IN  
MACAO WHO HAS MADE PREVIOUS TRIPS TO HONG KONG AND WESTERN EUROPE.  
TRAVEL WOULD SHOW IN PPT. SUBJECT IS NOW ON RETURN LEG OF TRIP AT WHICH  
ROUND-TRIP FRANKFURT-MACAO-FRANKFURT WHEN HE LANDS IN TEHRAN. AT WHICH  
POINT ACTUAL USE OF ALIAS PPT BEGINS. THIS ITINERARY WOULD PERMIT USE  
OF AIRLINE TICKET WHICH MAY BE "OPEN".

4. HAVE CAPABILITY TO ISSUE FOLLOWING SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS:  
A. SMALLPOX AND CHOLERA VACCINATION CERTIFICATES FROM HONG KONG  
B. MACAO RESIDENT'S ID CARD, WHICH OSTEENSIBLY COULD HAVE BEEN  
ISSUED A FEW YEARS BACK, DEPENDING ON AVAILABILITY OF OLD  
PHOTOS OF SUBJECT.

5. ITEMS NEEDED FROM TEHRAN FOR DOCUMENT ISSUANCE ARE:



PAGE 2 DIRTECH 54895 S E C R E T

- A- OLD AND RECENT PHOTOS OF SUBJECT, AS AVAILABLE, NEGATIVES ARE PREFERRED. HQS CAN MAKE FIRST GENERATION PRINT OF SUBJECT'S PHOTO IN LNYUMA FILES.
  - B- ALIAS WITH TWO GIVEN NAMES AND TWO FAMILY NAMES CAN BE PROVIDED BY OTS AND CABLED TO TEHRAN FOR USE IN OBTAINING SIX SIGNATURE SPECIMENS OF SAME MADE PERSONALLY BY SUBJECT.
  6. REQUEST STATION'S VIEWS RE SUITABILITY OF PORTUGUESE RPT ISSUED IN MACAO. IF ALIAS DOCUMENTATION IS USED, ADVISE WHETHER STATION BELIEVES ALSO DISGUISE WILL BE USED.
  7. FRANTECH: COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS INVITED. OTS RECORDS DO NOT REFLECT EZNOVA PORTUGUESE PPV ISSUANCE CAPABILITY. WILL FORWARD IF NEEDED. PLS ADVISE.
  8. ABOVE PROPOSAL INTENDED MERELY AS INITIAL THINKING ON EXFILTRATION IF IT ARISES.
  9. FILE: 221-949163. RVW 25 OCT 99 DRV G901.1A BY 063883.
- S E C R E T

7 OCT 79 013 43Z

S E C R E T 061044Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE FRANTECH 39945  
TO: IMMEDIATE DIRTECH INFO IMMEDIATE TEHRAN, DIRECTOR  
WINDREY RYBAT TECHS AJANA PLSDURN FJFASTIME  
REF: A. DIRECTOR 526866  
B. DIRTECH 57895  
C. FRANTECH 39926 (NOTAL)

REF B SCENARIO FOR POSSIBLE SDURN EXFILTRATION FROM IRA WITH PORTUGUESE DOCUMENTATION WORTH CONSIDERATION. WE FEEL HOWEVER, THAT REQUIREMENT FOR ENTRY VISA IN ITSELF SHOULD NOT ELIMINATE CONSIDERATION OF LATIN AMERICAN OR OTHER NATIONALITY PASSPORT REQUIRING VISA. OUR LATEST INFORMATION ON TRAVEL TO IRAN IS IN THIS VISA-REQUIRED STATUS (RUTHERFORD REPORTED THAT HE RECEIVED ENTRY VISA IN ATHENS WITHOUT DELAY OR PROBLEM). OUR INFORMATION ON TRAVEL TO IRAN IN NON-VISA STATUS IS INCOMPLETE, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO THE HANDWRITTEN ENTRIES ON BOTTOM OF DEBARKATION CARD REQUIRED FOR DEPARTURE. EXFILTRATION IN THIS STATUS WOULD REQUIRE COLLECTION EFFORT TO FILL IN THIS GAP.

2. WE FEEL THAT IF IRAN ENTRY VISAS ARE NOW MORE READILY AVAILABLE THAN IN PAST, IT MIGHT EVEN BE POSSIBLE TO HAVE VISA LEGITIMATELY PLACED IN SUBJECT'S PASSPORT. IF NOT, EXEMPLARS FOR REPRODUCTION WOULD BE AVAILABLE. USE OF LATIN AMERICAN OR OTHER NATIONALITY PASSPORT REQUIRING ENTRY VISA SHOULD BE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED. WE DO NOT HAVE BLANK PORTUGUESE

3. RUTHERFORD REPORTED THAT ON ARRIVAL IN IRAN, HE WAS QUESTIONED SEVERAL TIMES AT DIFFERENT POINTS DURING THE PASSPORT CONTROL/CUSTOMS EXAMINATION PROCEDURE ON HIS REASON FOR TRAVEL TO IRAN AND HIS INTENDED LENGTH OF STAY. HE NOTICED NO EXTRAORDINARY CONTROL MEASURES ON DEPARTURE.

4. FOR TEHRAN: WE REALIZE THAT DOCUMENTATION EXFILTRATION IS ONLY POSSIBILITY AT THIS POINT. HOWEVER, SUGGEST THAT EFFORTS BE MADE TO EXAMINE PASSPORTS/DEBARKATION CARDS OF RECENT VISITORS IN BOTH VISA AND NON-VISA CATEGORIES.

5. FILE: 221-949163. RVW 6 OCT 99 DRV D9C.1.  
S E C R E T  
BT  
#9945





22 OCT 79 14 51Z

SECRET 221414Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE DIRTECH 55158

TO: PRIORITY FRANTECH INFO TEMRAN, DIRECTOR.

UNINTEL RYBAT LRGAMIN AJAJA PLSDURN PJFASTIME TEOME

REFS: A. DIRTECH 54893  
B. DIRTECH 54982  
C. DIRTECH 35224

1. ITEMS LISTED BELOW BEING POUCHED VIA T. NLR 910964, AS PROMISED IN REFS FOR POSSIBLE USE IN DOCUMENTING SOURCE.

A. NOTIONAL DRY SEAL FOR BEARER'S PHOTO IN PORTUGUESE PPT ISSUED IN MACAO. FICHES SHOWING MACAO-ISSUED PPT DISPLAY NO VISIBLE EVIDENCE OF SEAL. HOWEVER, PORTUGUESE PPT'S ISSUED ELSEWHERE APPEAR TO HAVE SEAL OR CACHET. ALSO PHRASE "CACHET/DRY SEAL" IS PRINTED IN PORTUGUESE BETWEEN TWO PHOTO BLOCKS IN PORTUGUESE PPT NOTIONAL SEAL BASED ON CACHET OF PORTUGUESE CONSULATE GENERAL, PARIS, 1975.

B. NEGATIVES AND COLOR ANNOTATED XEROX COPIES OF TWO PPT PAGE SPREADS SHOWING 1979 MACAO AND HONG KONG CACHETS.

2. PPT FROM WHICH ITEM B COPIES WERE MADE WAS PHOTOGRAPHED OUTLINEY FOR INCLUSION IN ITD SYSTEM.

3. FILE# 221-949163. RVW 150CT99 DRV CSCI-14 BY 263883.  
SECRET

SOURN/I. MR. BAHRAMIAN. SELF-EMPLOYED CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTOR. MARRIED, WITH AT LEAST ONE CHILD, A SON AGED ABOUT 12. U/I AGED ABOUT 40.

U/I, AS OF AUGUST 79, WAS A MEMBER OF AN INFORMAL GROUP ADVISING AND CONSULTING WITH PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN. (IT IS RECALLED THAT HE MENTIONED TWO OR PERHAPS THREE NAMES OF OTHER MEMBERS; IT IS BELIEVED THAT ENTEZIM AND A MR. SAHABI WERE AMONG THEM.) IN THIS CAPACITY, HE REPORTED ON THE PLANS AND ACTIVITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT.

BETWEEN LATE JUNE AND THE SEIZURE OF THE EMBASSY, THERE WERE THREE OR FOUR MEETINGS WITH U/I, ALL OF THEM IN AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER. HIS INFORMATION REPORTING DURING THAT PERIOD CONCERNED A RURAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN PROPOSING THE MOBILIZATION OF UNEMPLOYED TECHNICIANS AND THE ~~ARE~~ RESOURCES OF MINISTRIES SUCH AS ROADS AND HEALTH. (U/I WAS UNABLE TO RESPOND TO STATION QUERIES ABOUT SUCH MATTERS AS THE SUBSTANCE OF BAZARGAN'S MEETINGS WITH THE IMAM.)

IN LATE SEPTEMBER OR EARLY OCTOBER, AFTER U/I HAD MISSED TWO PRE-ARRANGED MEETINGS, SEVERAL UNSUCCESSFUL EFFORTS WERE MADE TO CONTACT HIM BY PHONE. HE WAS FINALLY REACHED AT HOME. HE SAID HE WAS WORRIED ABOUT HIS SAFETY, AS A 'GUARD' (PERHAPS A SURVEILLANT) HAD RECENTLY APPEARED OUTSIDE HIS HOME. HE SAID HE DID NOT KNOW TO WHAT ORGANIZATION THIS GUARD BELONGED, BUT THAT IN VIEW OF MR NAZIH'S DIFFICULTIES, HE WAS AFRAID HE MIGHT BE ARRESTED. U/I SAID HE HAD DECIDED TO ~~END~~ TERMINATE HIS ASSOCIATION WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, CLOSE HIS BUSINESS, AND LEAVE THE COUNTRY. HE SAID HE PLANNED TO LEAVE IRAN IMMEDIATELY AFTER A TRIP TO BALUCHISTAN (AS RECALLED) TO CONCLUDE SOME BUSINESS THERE. HE WAS ASKED TO MAKE PHONE CONTACT UPON HIS RETURN. HE DID NOT DO SO, AND THERE WAS NO SUBSEQUENT COMMUNICATION WITH HIM.

THE STATION REPORTED THIS DEVELOPMENT, AND HQS INSTRUCTED WOLOCK, EZNOVA, AND EZVINO TO BEGIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN CASE U/I NEEDED HELP TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY. DETAILS OF SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE ARE NOT RECALLED, BUT IT IS BELIEVED THAT MACAO AND LEBANESE PASSPORTS WERE BEING CONSIDERED. AS THERE WAS NO FURTHER CONTACT WITH, NO ASSISTANCE WAS EVER ASKED OR OFFERED.

Real Name: Khusrow Qashqai.

Code Name: S. D. Rater/4.

In this section the documents concerned with Qashqai are contained, a part of which is related to the documents of the Foreign Affairs Ministry and another part is concerned with the documents of the C. I. A. (those belonging to the period between 1330-1343 Shamsi-Hijri (1951-1964) are related with the Iranian Foreign Ministry and the rest are related with the C. I. A. ).

A little attention to the dates and the contents of the documents related with the Foreign Affairs Ministry and Qashqai's meetings with the officials of the embassy (during 1952) is sufficient to reveal the extent of his association with the U. S. administration and the nature of his activities. In spite of his anti-Shah tendencies he was favourably inclined towards America and the West, and in this regard he never hesitated to express his urge to help them.

The C. I. A. documents concerned with Khusrow Qashqai are mostly composed of his reports, his meetings with the C. I. A. officials and his

stand vis-a-vis the then current course of events in Iran. There is nothing available regarding his past record with the C. I. A.

Though he did not receive any salary from the C. I. A., his co-operation with America may have been on account of his intention to gain support from America in fulfilling his future ambitions concerning the Islamic Republic.

The principal reports and opinions of Khusrow Qashqai revolve around certain specific aims:

-By weakening the provisional government and secretly opposing the Islamic Republic, while outwardly, supporting it, he was planning to incite different political and military leaders into starting a series of operations to overthrow the government. In this connection he made contacts with Madani and asked him to supervise a military coup against the Imam and the Bazargan government. According to his own claims, Qashqai contemplated certain preventive, and strategic measures necessary for opposing the government and launching an armed struggle against the Islamic Republic. Contacts were also made with him from the side of Bakhtiyar and he was even offered payment for organizing a coup. During one of his meetings he speaks about his contacts with the Arab dissidents and that they will act as the suppliers of arms to the non-Arab tribes of the south every now and then.

- Qashqai was planning to bring out a publication in association with Madani, and he had informed the C. I. A. about this plan. The C. I. A., too, was thinking about the possibilities of bringing out a publication which would serve as their organ against the anti-American atmosphere prevailing in Iran and would counter the attacks against America. The C. I. A. was secretly planning to not only encourage Khusrow Qashqai in this regard but also to give him the material aid that he was asking for to aid in the printing and distribution of this publication. They advised him to take steps to select the material desired to be published.

Through these meetings and visits the C. I. A. wanted to attain the following aims:

- Obtain information about the Qashqai tribe and the possibilities of this tribe in confronting the Islamic Republic and the chances of exploiting it in emergency conditions, since they believed that the Qashqais were the only tribe besides the Kurds, who were in a position to put up active resistance.

- Obtain information about the security conditions in Khuzistan and Fars Provinces.

- To reach a political understanding with Madani, because Qashqai had a close relationship with him.

- To watch Qashqai in his anti-government activities. The appoint-

ment of Qashqai was meant for fulfilling different purposes such as influencing the National Front for promoting the pro-America moderate forces and supplying them with information and reports; arranging meetings with the Interior Minister Haj Sayed Jawwadi with the view of getting information about the future programmes of the provisional government concerning the elections; arranging meetings with Shariat Madari and Khaqani in order to establish a possible future programme; and meeting with brigadier general Jam with the hope of fulfilling, a certain function in a specified period of time. On the whole, the aim of using Qashqai as an intermediary and a catalyst agent was bringing together all the pro-American moderate forces throughout the various classes of society. (The document about this part can be seen with the documents concerning Shariat Madari).

CONFIDENTIAL

*2/1/57  
1/14/57  
1/14/57  
1/14/57*

Khosro QASHQAI was a Deputy to the 16th and 17th Majlis and a close advisor to Mossadeq on tribal affairs. He, along with several of his brothers, is in official exile from Iran and now lives in Geneva, although he is in the U.S. at the moment. He is extremely active and vocal in opposition to the Shah's government, but is probably out of contact with most of the groups within Iran, except through his brother Mohammad Hosein, who is permitted to live in Tehran. He is reportedly addicted to drugs.

—Le gouvernement a décidé de saisir les biens de certains chefs de tribus du sud qui sont restés en Iran. Le célèbre parc Eran, à Chiraz, propriété de Khosrow Kachai, a été saisi. (Setareh Salan du 4) 2/1/57

*12/19/62*

KHOSROW QASHQAI is brother of MOSSADEQ. Khosrow Qashqa'i, now in Europe, has written a letter to Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq, the former Prime Minister. He expresses his unhappiness in this letter about the state of the National Front. In his reply, Dr. Mossadeq wrote that he too is dissatisfied with the leaders of the National Front. Khosrow Qashqa'i has released both letters to the European press. (Diplomat

CONFIDENTIAL

Tehran 186 Enclosure 1

BIOGRAPHIC DATA

*Encl. #7*

GASH-AI, Khosro

Personal data:

Born 1921, Firuzabad; youngest son of Seyid-ah-Doleh; unmarried.

Education:

Albora College, Tehran.

Languages:

Turkish, Persian, English.

Career:

1941

Assumed duties as one of four brothers responsible to their mother for conduct of Qashqai tribal affairs.

Nov. 1942

Conference at Shiraz with British Consul re general tribal policy.

July 1944

Supplied with arms and ammunition by government; pursued and subdued his fugitive cousin Chenghis Khan.

1947-49

Deputy from Firuzabad to 15th Majlis.

Nov. 1947

Traveled in Switzerland and America.

April 1948

Returned to Iran.

1950

Deputy from Firuzabad to 16th Majlis; member of Agricultural Commission of Majlis.

Remarks:

Shortly after leaving the American College of Tehran in 1939, Khosro Khan assumed his tribal duties and since that time has spent most of his time in the provinces as compared with his brothers who spent most of their time in Tehran. Until his election to the 15th Majlis, he paid only periodic visits to Tehran and was the least publicized of the four brothers. In 1943 he was appointed Governor of Firuzabad, his duties consisting for the most part of keeping belligerent sub-tribal leaders in line and conferring from time to time with high-ranking officers of the Iranian Army. At that time the Qashqa'is were not in favor with the Central Government because of their previous pro-German sympathies and their refusal to disarm their tribesmen.

In August of 1944 Khosro was supplied with Government arms and ammunition and, with fifty followers, pursued and subdued his fugitive cousin Chenghis Khan.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Tehran 185 Enclosure 1 2

In February, 1942, Khosro was involved in the "Semiran" incident. The Qashgai tribe led by him attacked the Semiran garrison, killing about 100 soldiers and executing the Commanding Officer. In 1946 during the Fars National Movement he participated in the fighting against the Government.

In October, 1947, after a series of disputes over disarming the tribesmen, he was granted a visa to the U.S. and Switzerland. Local comment concerning the trip attributed it to an effort on the part of the Qashgais to soothe the Shah's feelings..

In the present Majlis, Khosro is one of the four secretaries of the Majlis.

He is of medium height, stocky, an athlete, with heavy Turkish features, heavy black hair and a pleasant smile.

Preocious, consistently pro-American, anti-Russian and distrustful of the British.

CONFIDENTIAL



SECRET  
Security Information  
THE FOREIGN SERVICE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
Office of the Army Attache

Tehran, Iran  
26 July 1952

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Cuomo, American Embassy

Khosrow's remarks include the following:

Prince Ali Reza was in the disturbances Monday and personally shot and killed two Iranians.

The Committee of Inquiry will determine who was responsible for the civilian killings Monday and they will all hang.


I hate the Shah.

All of Army G-2 are guilty and will come before the Committee.

Use of the Army against Iranians is unconstitutional.

I just paid General Garzan 10,000 tomans last week (rest of sentence undistinguishable).

I am pro-American.

  
JOHN I. HINCKE  
Colonel, GS  
Army Attache

SECRET  
Security Information



MEMORANDUM RESTRICTED

July 24, 1952

TO: Mr. Cuomo

FROM: Mr. Norden

SUB: Conversation with Khosro Quashqai

Last night at Mr. Melbourne's cocktail party I joined a conversation between Col. Hincke and Khosro Quashqai, which may be of interest to you.

Quashqai was holding forth about popular feelings against the Shah, and maintained that we would not find a single picture of the Shah in a public place today as the crowds will have ripped them all down. He added that he himself had a score to settle with the Shah because the Shah's father had killed his father, but added that the Shah was still useful. An argument also developed as to whether the Shah was Commander-in-Chief of the Army: Quashqai had maintained that American Military Aid was given to the Shah and not to Iran.

Some of Quashqai's assertions were so close to the Tudeh line that I felt constrained to ask him if he was a member of the National Front, which he said he was. No doubt Col. Hincke can give you further details, as the discussion was well advanced when I joined it.

*cdh*

CONFIDENTIAL

SUPPLEMENTARY BIOGRAPHIC DATA

October 4, 1952

QASHQAI, Khosro Khan

Supplementing Embassy's undated CBD.

Career:

1950 - February 1952: Deputy to 16th Majlis from Firuzabad. Vice-President of Majlis.

April 27, 1952: Deputy to 17th Majlis from Firuzabad.

Remarks:

Qashqai's election went unchallenged, based as it was on the votes of his tribesmen. While critical of some of Dr. Mosadeq's policies, furthermore, he has consistently and openly supported the government and is one of the National Front's most valuable assets.

Recently Qashqai delivered a bitter speech in the Majlis, attacking Americans for their alleged "sabotage" of the Mosadeq government during the brief premiership of Qavam. His friendship for various members of the American Embassy has, however, continued, and he has explained his outburst as an attempt to open American eyes to their mistake in failing to support the National Front government strenuously. He has further explained his objection to the U.S. military missions by insisting that the resulting equipment and trained men will be used against the interests of Iran. He appears to have chosen to stick with Mosadeq in the ever-widening split between Keshani and the Prime Minister, but his tendency toward intrigue on a master scale makes any such conclusion tenuous at best.

MRParish/mrp

OFFICIAL - INTERNAL  
CONFIDENTIAL

AMERICAN EMBASSY,  
Tehran, Iran, October 28, 1954.

My dear Mr. Buckingham:

I am enclosing an office memorandum to you on a visit of Khosro Khan to Shiraz while I was there. I thought it might be of interest to you. I am giving Mr. Koren a carbon copy also.

My visit to Pars was most enjoyable. I flew to Shiraz on Saturday morning. I went out to Persepolis Sunday and on Monday and Tuesday remained in Shiraz. I returned to Tehran by air on Tuesday afternoon.

I hope you and Mrs. Buckingham had an interesting trip. Mr. Gilfillen mentioned that he hoped you would visit Shiraz again.

I enjoyed meeting you and hope to have the pleasure of being with you and Mrs. Buckingham again.

Sincerely,

Robert L. Funseth  
American Vice Consul

Enclosure;  
Office Memo

Bryant Buckingham, Esquire,  
American Consul,  
Isfahan.

CONFIDENTIAL

Bryant Buckingham, American Consul, Isfahan

October 28, 1954

Robert L. Funseth, American Vice Consul, Tabriz

Khosro KHAN, Recent Visit to Shiraz

While discussing informally and unofficially the general subject of the tribes with Mr. BAHMANBEGUI, Chief of Tribal Education Program of Point Four in Shiraz, I learned that Khosro KHAN had visited General AZIZI on Sunday, October 24. According to Bahmanbegui, Khosro Khan is presently living at Firuzabad.

Subsequently Mr. Donald Gilfillen, Provincial Director of Point Four in Shiraz told me that General Azisi was calling on him that afternoon (October 25). I suggested to Mr. Gilfillen that he casually mention the Khosro visit to the General. The following information was related to me by Mr. Gilfillen after his talk with General Azisi.

According to General Azisi a messenger from Khosro Khan called on him Sunday advising that Khosro was outside of the city and would like safe passage in order to talk with the General. The General said he promptly sent an escort and had Khosro Khan brought to his office. The General told Mr. Gilfillen that Khosro appeared very nervous. Azisi said he told Khosro he had no reason to feel insecure. Further that Khosro could travel freely anywhere without fear. However, the General said he told him that the Government still insisted that Khosro leave before a certain date or be subject to arrest. He said he told Khosro the Government in general and his command in Pars in particular were desirous of good relations with the tribes. The General said he told him there was to be no trouble with the tribes. However he said he told Khosro because of his activities last year in stirring up trouble it was absolutely mandatory that he leave. The General implied, according to Mr. Gilfillen, that if Khosro didn't get out upon this date (the General did not mention the date) the Army would come and get him out.

This ends information I received concerning the Gilfillen-Azisi conversation. In my earlier conversation, Bahmanbegui said that he believed Khosro Khan no longer had much support amongst the tribes. According to Bahmanbegui the support Khosro still enjoys is based solely on his wealth.

Background on Bahmanbegui: About 40 years old. Is a member of the Amaleh tribe. His father is in the mountains with his sub-tribe. Bahmanbegui is a graduate of the University of Tehran law school. He directs the Point Four tribal education program which appears to be an excellent operation. He seems sincerely interested in his work.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

He visited the United States in 1952 for six months on a private visit. This trip was mostly financed by Khosro Khan. He speaks good English. He told me that because he opposed Khosro in his abortive act of last year he has lost favor with him. He implied that he was active in forming an opposition to the Khan's acts.

cc: Mr. Koren  
AmConsulate, Tabriz

CONFIDENTIAL

July 1952

Mr. Cuomo

Last night at Mr. Melbournes I joined Khosro Quashqai and Commander Pollard for a few moments. Quashqai was saying that the US had supplied the arms that killed innocent people and was therefore guilty of their murder. Pollard pointed out that all Military aid had been turned over to the Iranian Government. Quashqai replied that there had been no real Iranian Government for forty years but an Intelligence Service Govt. A Govt of Major Jackson, Dr. Zenner and Middleton. The point was wld the US now aid the real Iranian Govt. The arms had been given to the Shah in the past. At this point he said "I have a score to settle with the Shah and one day I will settle it". He said what Iran needs is a democratic Shah. At this point I left the group.

WBC

This document consists of 2 pages, Series 26-B

Reproduction of this document is authorized by the Director of Central Intelligence, Department of State, on 1/15/68

**SECRET**

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

*NY 100-115-68*  
*Cabled 1-15-68*

20 DEC 1967

"This document consists of 2 pages.  
Copy 1 of 2 received. Series SY-A"

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: Khosrow Khan QASHGAI

1. A reliable and sensitive source has reported that Khosrow Khan QASHGAI has received an invitation to visit the United States from his nephew, Amir Abdollah QASHGAI, a doctor residing at No. 1 Main Street, Chisholm, Maine.
2. Khosrow Khan QASHGAI, an Iranian citizen was born circa 1920 in Shiraz, Iran. He is one of the exiled leaders of the Qashgai tribe in Iran. The Qashgai leaders were forced to flee Iran about 1954 due to their continued opposition which at times led to armed revolt against the present regime of Iran. Subject presently resides in Munich, Germany where he maintains contact with all of the anti-regime elements residing abroad.
3. Should Subject accept his nephew's invitation to visit the United States, this Agency would appreciate having Subject's activities monitored and kept informed of his contacts.
4. In order to protect our source you are requested not to reveal the source of the above information in any conversations you have with Subject.

CSCI/316/05342-67

cc: Immigration & Naturalization Service  
Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JAN 3 1968

Intelligence Liaison Section

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
JAN 3 1968  
OFFICE OF SECURITY

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

**SECRET**

| DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT   |  |   |  |
|---|--|---|--|
| NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.   |  | This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report. |  |
| 1. COUNTRY: Iran  |  | 2. REPORT NUMBER: 2846045763  |  |
| 3. SUBJECT: (C) Insurrection - Plan of Khosrow Khan Qashgai   |  | 4. DATE OF REPORT: 19 June 1963   |  |
| 5. ISC NUMBER:  |  | 6. NO. OF PAGES: 2  |  |
| 7. DATE OF INFORMATION: 6 Jun 63  |  | 8. REFERENCES: DIRM 144a  |  |
| 9. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Tehran, 15 Jun 63   |  | 10. ORIGINATOR: UJWARMA, Iran   |  |
| 11. EVALUATION: SOURCE B INFORMATION 3  |  | 12. PREPARED BY: Col. G.M. POSTON   |  |
| 13. SOURCE: Highly Competent U.S. Observer  |  | 14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: U.S. ARMY Attache  |  |
| 15. SUMMARY: Report contains information on the current status and projected plans of Khosrow Khan Qashgai.   |  |   |  |
| 16. COMMENTS: 1. Khosrow Khan Qashgai and his mother plan to leave Germany in the near future as his passport has been withdrawn. He would not disclose his ultimate destination, but the source estimates he will try to "infiltrate" into Iran.<br>2. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was in Munich about 1 June. He returned to Switzerland and will return to Germany in the near future.<br>3. Student demonstrations are scheduled to take place in Europe in the near future. They will include attacks on the Iranian Embassy.<br>4. Khosrow Khan claims to have collected 400,000 dollars from Iranian exiles. |  |   |  |
| 17. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR: Embassy, Tehran OR, Tehran  |  | 18. DOWNGRADING DATA: DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVAL; UNCLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS, 203 UIR 5200.10   |  |
| 19. NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION  |  | 20. SECRET  |  |

DD FORM 1396

REPLACES DA FORM 100, 1 AUG 58, WHICH MAY BE USED UNTIL 1 JAN 68.

| DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT   |  |  |   |
|---|--|--|---|
| CONTINUATION SHEET  | SECRET<br>NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION<br>(Class/Section and Control Markings) | REPORT NO. 2846047763  | PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES<br>ORIGINATOR OCSA/MA, Iran |
|   |  |  |   |
| <p>students in Europe. He intends to use the money for the purchase of arms. He is interested in obtaining .45 caliber grease guns (M-3 SMG), M16, 3.5 inch rocket launchers and plastic explosives. These he hopes to be able to get into Iran in order to conduct terrorist attacks on lines of communication.</p> <p>5. He estimated that the most groups of tribes to join in resistance against the government are the Bakhtiari with the Kurds, with the exception of the Javanmudi following.</p> <p>6. If he can obtain the necessary propaganda means, radios, loud-speakers, and broadcasting equipment, he intends to carry out a propaganda campaign against the government concurrently with his raids on communication lines.</p> <p>7. His information is that the tribes to date have taken 2,500 rifles from the IIA and IIS in Fars.</p> <p>8. He states that the British 10-shot rifle which is reportedly in Fars is a British WWII type rifle.</p> <p>9. M-1 ammunition is now 5 Tonnage (approx .660) per round in Fars.</p> <p>10. Khoras Khan claims he is in close contact with Teimer Bakhtiar and they hope to use the latter's influence among the IIA officers in order to undermine the present regime.</p> <p>COMMENT: The source describes Khoras Khan to be motivated by only one objective, i.e. the overthrow of KIM. Source states that as a means to this end, Khoras Khan has become an avid student of guerrilla operations. Source, who recently visited with many Gahngmids, believes Khoras Khan has more acceptance with the Gahngmids than is generally accepted. Source believes that Khoras Khan has relative good information on the events which occur in Iran. While the estimates of the number of arms seized from the IIA and IIS are high, they are not beyond the realm of possibility. Reliable foreign military sources estimate loss of arms by the IIA may be at least this high. They state losses include 3-4 4.2 mortars and at least two truckloads of .30 caliber machine guns (estimated 30 to 40). In addition, the tribes through deceptive camp layouts have been the recipients of one complete drop of food and ammunition.</p> <p>COMMENT: (Of Preparing Officer) Even in Europe with discounts, \$25,000 will not go far in purchasing automatic weapons, bazookas and communication equipment. About all Khoras Khan could obtain would be enough material to fool some of the people some of the time as to his degree of outside backing.</p> <p>FIELD COORDINATION: CAS, STATE/DoL</p> |  |  |   |
| DD FORM 1396c<br>1 FEB 62   |  | NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION<br>SECRET<br>(Class/Section and Control Markings) |   |

QASHQAI, Khosrow

CONFIDENTIAL

FF

Residing in Germany.

Foreign Ministry requested he not be granted a visa for US during Shah's visit. Past record of making trouble during visits of Shah.

Tehran Telegram 1114  
June 3, 1964

FORM PB-458  
4-23-57



REPORT CLASS: SECRET--WNINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT--ORCON

COUNTRY: IRAN

SUBJECT: QASHGAI POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND MILITARY CONTINGENCY  
PREPARATIONS (DOI: EARLY JULY 1979)

SOURCE: A MEMBER OF THE QASHGAI TRIBE WHO IS A CONFIDANT OF A  
SENIOR QASHGAI TRIBAL LEADER WITH HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS  
IN THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN. HIS REPORTING RELIABILITY  
HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

ALTHOUGH KHOSROW QASHGAI STILL SUPPORTS THE PROVISIONAL  
GOVERNMENT OF PRIME MINISTER MEHDI BAZARGAN, HE SEES ITS  
AUTHORITY AS LIMITED AND STILL DECLINING, AND BELIEVES THAT WITHIN  
THE NEXT THREE MONTHS WIDESPREAD AND VIOLENT CIVIL DISORDER IS  
LIKELY TO RESUME. HE IS THEREFORE PROCEEDING TO CONSOLIDATE  
ARRANGEMENTS WITH VARIOUS POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERS IN SOUTHERN  
IRAN AND IN TEHRAN IN ORDER TO PROTECT THE QASHGAI PEOPLE AND THEIR  
ALLIES FROM THE EFFECTS OF FURTHER EVAPORATION OF GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY.  
QASHGAI ESTIMATES THAT HE IS SUPPORTED BY NINETY PERCENT OF THE  
POPULATION IN AREAS WHERE THE QASHGAI PEOPLE ARE NUMEROUS, AND  
THAT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT ALSO IN ADJACENT PORTIONS OF  
SOUTHWEST IRAN. HE BELIEVES THAT HIS SUPPORTERS NOW NUMBER  
SOME FIVE MILLION. (FIELD COMMENT: SOURCE IS IN FULL SYMPATHY  
WITH KHOSROW QASHGAI'S OBJECTIVES, AND IS NOT EXPECTED TO CORRECT  
ANY EXAGGERATION IN THE LATTER'S ESTIMATES OF QASHGAI NUMERICAL  
STRENGTH AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE.)

2. THE QASHGAI'S ARE DEVELOPING CONTACTS WITH MILITARY  
COMMANDERS BOTH LOCALLY AND IN TEHRAN. THERE ARE CLOSE CONTACTS  
WITH THE COMMANDERS OF ARMORED AND INFANTRY UNITS IN SHIRAZ AND  
ISFAHAN, AND THERE IS CONTACT ALSO IN TEHRAN WITH BRIGADIER GENERAL  
ALI RAJALI, A FORMER COMMANDER OF THE IRANIAN GROUND FORCES. (FIELD  
COMMENT: SOURCE DID NOT REVEAL THE SUBSTANCE OF THESE CONTACTS.)  
ATTEMPTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO DEVELOP SIMILAR CONTACTS IN THE AIR  
FORCE, BUT THESE HAVE NOT BEEN FRUITFUL, LARGELY BECAUSE OF THE  
DISRUPTION OF AIR FORCE ACTIVITY AND ORGANIZATION BY THE TECHNICIANS  
KNOWN AS MOJAFARS.

3. QASHGAI TRIBESMEN ARE ACQUIRING NEW WEAPONS. THE LATEST  
ACQUISITION IS A SHIPMENT OF 400 KALASHNIKOV RIFLES. MOST QASHGAI  
ARMS ARE INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS, BUT THERE ARE SOME MACHINE GUNS AND  
FEW MORTARS.

4. A QASHGAI, TEHRAN (9 JULY 1979). FIELD REPORT NO. NI  
0.63

5. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AND DEFENSE ATTACHE AT TEHRAN.  
NT TO AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, ISLAMABAD, JIDDA, KABUL, KARACHI,  
MAIT, NEW DELHI, TEL AVIV.  
REPORT CLASS: SECRET--WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND  
METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RE-  
LEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS. DISSEMINATION  
AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR.  
14 JUL 79 DRV DRC:1. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING  
OFFICE. ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF  
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT.

PORT CLASS SECRET--WNINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT--ORCON

ENTRY: IRAN

SUBJECT: VIEWS OF QASHQAI LEADER ON THE IRANIAN POLITICAL SITUATION

NOTE: A MEMBER OF THE QASHQAI TRIBE WHO IS A CONFIDANT OF A SENIOR QASHQAI TRIBAL LEADER WITH HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS IN THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN. HIS REPORTING RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

1. IN EARLY JULY 1979, QASHQAI TRIBAL LEADER KHOSROW ASHQAI GAVE CLOSE ASSOCIATES THE FOLLOWING INTERPRETATION OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN IRAN.

A. AYA OLLAH RUHOLLAH KHOMEINI IS THE MOST INTELLIGENT AND LEAST REACTIONARY OF THE IMPORTANT MULLAHS, BUT HIS RIGID FUNDAMENTALISM INHIBITS HIM FROM DELEGATING REAL POWER TO THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN (PGOI). EVEN IF HE WERE DESIGNED TO DO SO, THE REST OF THE RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT WOULD EVENTUALLY ENJOY THE SUPPORT OF PERHAPS 70 PERCENT OF IRANIANS, BUT THIS SUPPORT IS ERODING AT A RATE WHICH COULD CUT IT IN HALF IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS. (FIELD COMMENT: ASKED WHETHER QASHQAI CONSIDERS MULLAHS SUCH AS KAREZ SHAH RIAI MA'DARI TO BE MORE MODERATE THAN KHOMEINI, SOURCE SAID THAT QASHQAI REGARDS MA'DARI AS A POLITICIAN, NOT A RELIGIOUS FIGURE.)

B. THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT'S WEAKNESS DERIVES ONLY PARTLY FROM ITS DEPENDENCE ON KHOMEINI. TWO OTHER IMPORTANT FACTORS ARE THE GOVERNMENT'S LACK OF POLITICAL EXPERTISE AND ITS INTERNAL DIVISIONS, THE RESULT OF WHICH IS THAT THE PGOI DOES NOT EXERCISE THE POWER IT ALREADY HAS. (SOURCE COMMENT: QASHQAI DID NOT DESCRIBE THE INTERNAL DIVISIONS OR IDENTIFY AREAS IN WHICH THE GOVERNMENT IS MISSING OPPORTUNITIES TO MAKE ITS AUTHORITY FELT.)

C. TWO FACTORS ARE LIKELY TO COMBINE TO PRODUCE RENEWED ACTIVE CIVIL DISORDER. ONE IS THE GROWING TENSION AMONG POLITICAL GROUPS, EACH OF WHICH, MORE OR LESS REGARDLESS OF IDEOLOGY, AIMS

ACQUIRING A MONOPOLY OF POWER. SECOND IS THE PROSPECT OF ECONOMIC HARDSHIP. THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO SUSPEND FUNDING OF PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS WHILE IT LOOKS FOR EVIDENCE OF FINANCIAL ABUSES, WITH A RESULTING INCREASE IN UNEMPLOYMENT. THIS IS COMPOUNDED BY THE DISTORTION OF THE RURAL ECONOMY, WHERE IT BECAME COMMONPLACE TO SEE, FOR EXAMPLE, IMPORTED FROZEN CHICKENS SOLD IN VILLAGES. THESE IMPORTS ARE NOW SUSPENDED, AND THE RURAL ECONOMY IS PREPARED NEITHER TO SUPPLY THE CITIES NOR MEET ALL ITS OWN NEEDS.

2. ACCORDING TO IRAN, TEHRAN (9 JULY 1979) FIELD REPORT NO. NIT-69.

3. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AND DEFENSE ATTACHE AT TEHRAN, AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, ISLAMABAD, JIDDA, KABUL, KARACHI, NIT, NEW DELHI, TEL AVIV.  
PORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR CONSULTANTS. DISSEMINATION EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR.  
NO JULY 99 DRV DSC.1. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.

10 JUN 79 11 51Z

SEC CR 10 99Z JUL 79 INTEL

CITE TEHRAN 5348  
TO: DIRECTOR, FT AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, ISLAM ABAD, JEDDAH, KABUL,  
KARACHI, QATAR, NEW DELHI, TEL AVIV.

UNINTEL INTEL DROTTER

SUPDATA: SROTOR R/4 ON 5 JULY. NO LIAISON. NO INDEX. PAGIN  
OBTAINED. DIR SEE TEHRAN 53648 NOT AFFECTING DISSEM.  
FIELD NO. NIT-10,629. CL BY 015356. NO FILE.

FILED: 1009 82

AUG 79 02 55Z

SEC CR 10 99Z JUL 79 STAFF

INTE DIRECTOR 486833.

TOP SECRET

UNINTEL SROTOR PSYCH

IT HAS NOW BEEN SIX MONTHS SINCE THE PRESENT REGIME  
TOOK POWER IN IRAN. IT HAD BEEN HOPED THAT IF THE IRANIS  
WERE LEFT MORE OR LESS ALONE FOR A PERIOD OF TIME A STABLE,  
OPERATIONAL, AND RELATIVELY PRO-UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MIGHT  
EMERGE. SUCH HAS NOT BEEN THE CASE, AND WE ARE FACED WITH CON-  
SIDERABLE STABILITY IN IRAN, GROWING SOVIET INVOLVEMENT NEAR  
AFGHANISTAN, AND A WORLD ENERGY CRISIS. BASED ON THIS  
SITUATION, WE WISH TO HAVE COVERT ACTION MECHANISMS  
IN PLACE TO SUPPLEMENT OVERT POLICY IF WE ARE CALLED UPON TO DO  
SO.

2. TO BEGIN, WE WANT TO INVESTIGATE THE POSSIBILITY OF  
DEVELOPING AN ENTERPRISE TO A NEWSPAPER WHICH WE CAN EITHER DIRECTLY  
CONTROL OR WHICH AT LEAST WOULD BE RESPONSIVE TO AN EDITORIAL  
POLICY WHICH WE WOULD DICTATE. INITIALLY WE WOULD HOPE TO HAVE  
A NEWSPAPER AVAILABLE TO EXPOSE AND COUNTER SOVIET INTERFERENCE  
IN THE AREA, AND FOR THIS PURPOSE HQS HAS THE NECESSARY AUTHORITY  
AND THE NEWSPAPER CAPABILITY HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED. IT SHOULD BE  
RELATIVELY SIMPLE MATTER TO SHIFT ITS DIRECTION TO LOCAL  
POLITICS. SHOULD SUCH A REQUIREMENT BE LEVIED ON ACTION.

3. AS TO HOW TO BEGIN THE SEARCH FOR SUCH A NEWSPAPER,  
DIR TEHRAN COMES IMMEDIATELY TO MIND. BACK IN FEBRUARY R/4 HAD  
TOLD US THAT HE WAS CONSIDERING SETTING UP A WEEKLY NEWSPAPER  
AND WOULD WELCOME COVERT AMERICAN SUPPORT. HQS RESPONDED BY AD-  
VISING THAT WHILE WE DOUBTED THAT SUCH AN IDEA WOULD HAVE MUCH  
APPEAL IN ITSELF, WE SHOULD BEAR R/4 OUT ON THE DETAILS OF HIS  
PROPOSAL. THIS MESSAGE WAS PASSED TO R/4 WHO SAID HE WOULD  
PROVIDE THE DETAILS AT A FUTURE MEETING. IN APRIL R/4 SAID THAT  
HE AND ADRAN MADANI WERE PLANNING TO START SEVERAL WEEKLY  
REGIONAL NEWSPAPERS AND HAD GOTTEN 25 MILLION RIALS TOGETHER FOR  
THE PURPOSE. IN MAY STATION REPORTED THAT R/4 SAID THAT HE AND

PAGE 2  
MADANI  
SO.

SECTION 485833 S E C R E T  
OULD START A WEEKLY NEWSPAPER IN TEHRAN IN A MONTH OR  
REQUEST STATION QUESTION R/4 AS TO THE STATUS OF HIS  
S AT NEXT MEETING. AS R/4 IS ASTUTE PERSON BELIEVE WE  
FRANK WITH HIM AS TO OUR REASON FOR RAISING MATTER;  
T WHILE NO POLICY TO ENGAGE IN PROPAGANDA IN IRAN HAS  
DECIDED UPON. WE WANT TO FULLY INVESTIGATE MATTER SO  
CAN BE MADE ON WHAT, IF ANY, ACTION IS TO BE TAKEN.  
BE INTERESTED IN FOLLOWING ON ANY PAPER R/4 IS PUBLISHING  
TO PUBLISH CIRCULATION, TARGET GROUP, MEANS OF  
B. EDITORIAL DIRECTION, TYPE AND DEGREE OF GOVT CENSOR-  
METHOD OF FUNDING. SHOULD R/4 RAISE MATTER OF FINANCIAL  
FROM US, PLEASE OBTAIN ESTIMATES OF WHAT HIS NEEDS WOULD  
BE AND RETURN HIS WILLINGNESS PERMIT OUR PARTICIPATION IN  
CONTENT.

IN ADDITION QUERYING R/4 RE HIS OWN NEWSPAPER. ALSO  
REQUEST TO ASK HIM IF HE AWARE OF OTHER PUBLICATIONS IN IRAN  
THAT MIGHT BE AMENABLE TO GOVT SUPPORT FROM US. REQUESTS IRAN  
WOULD BE INTERESTED IN SUCH PUBLICATIONS IN EUROPE WHICH HAVE  
CIRCUIT AMONG IRANIANS THERE.  
WELCOME STATION COMMENTS.

FILE: 201-265327. R/W 31JUL99 DRV D9C.1 A&L SECRET.  
E C R  
BT  
6579

18 AUG 1979 15 31Z  
E C R E T 182446Z AUG 79 DEFERRED TELEFONCH  
THE WASHINGTON 497711 SECTION 1 OF 2.

01: TEHRAN

ROM: NE IRAN/R INFO ADCNE, NE/INTEL, D PDS/EG/DDO/CS

SUBJECT: UNINTEL - REPORTS.

1. FOLLOWING ARE GRADES AND COMMENTS FOR JULY REPORTS  
LISTED BELOW REVIEWED 15 AUGUST 1979.

S. I. B.

NIT-10, 69 NO OPACT 10FIRDS-315/12271-79 RATING: 5  
(UNILATERAL) SDROTTER/4 SECRET/FULL CONTROLS  
DISSEMINATED 12 JULY 1979  
"QASHQAI POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND MILITARY CONTINGENCY  
PREPARATIONS" WHILE WE AGREE WITH FIELD COMMENT PARA ONE  
COMMENTS, WHILE WE AGREE WITH FIELD COMMENT PARA ONE  
THAT SDROTTER/4'S ESTIMATES OF QASHQAI NUMERICAL STRENGTH AND  
POLITICAL INFLUENCE MAY BE EXAGGERATED, HIS REPORTING ON THE  
QASHQAI TRIBE ITSELF IS UNIQUE. REPORT WAS USED IN ARMY'S AGST  
BRIEF.

S. I. B.

NIT-10, 69 NO OPACT 10FIRDS-315/12267-79 RATING: 5  
(UNILATERAL) SDROTTER/4 SECRET/FULL CONTROLS  
DISSEMINATED 10 JULY 1979  
"VIEWS OF QASHQAI LEADER ON THE IRANIAN POLITICAL  
SITUATION" COMMENT: WE APPRECIATE THE FACT THAT SDROTTER/4 TRIED  
TO PRESENT A BALANCED PICTURE OF THE POLITICAL SCENE IN IRAN,  
AND WE CONTINUE TO SOLICIT HIS VIEWS.

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WNINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT--ORCON

COUNTRY: IRAN

SUBJECT: POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND SECURITY CONCERNS OF KHUZESTAN  
GOVERNOR MADANI (DOI: EARLY SEPTEMBER 1979)

SOURCE : A MEMBER OF THE QASHQAI TRIBE WHO IS A CONFIDANT OF  
A SENIOR QASHQAI TRIBAL LEADER WITH HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS  
IN THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN. HIS REPORTING  
RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

1. AS OF EARLY SEPTEMBER 1979, AYATOLLAHS MOHAMED HOSSEIN  
B E N E S H T I AND HASSAN L A H O U T I WERE ATTEMPTING  
TO PERSUADE AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH K H O M E I N I THAT THE  
INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN (PGOI)  
CAN BEST BE REMEDIED BY REPLACING PRIME MINISTER MEHDI  
B A Z A R G A N I WITH ADMIRAL AHMAD M A D A N I, CURRENTLY  
GOVERNOR OF KHUZESTAN PROVINCE. (SOURCE COMMENT: KHOMEINI'S  
DECISION, IS NOT YET KNOWN, BUT THERE IS REASON TO  
BELIEVE THAT KHOMEINI IS PLEASED WITH MADANI'S SUCCESS IN  
KEEPING ARAB DISSIDENCE IN KHUZESTAN UNDER CONTROL.) (FIELD  
COMMENT: A RELIABLE SOURCE SAID ON 6 SEPTEMBER THAT BENESHTI  
IS GENERALLY THOUGHT TO BE PERSONALLY HOSTILE TO MADANI.)

2. QASHQAI TRIBAL LEADER KHOSROW Q A S H Q A I HAS  
RECOMMENDED TO ADMIRAL MADANI THAT THE LATTER LEAD A MILITARY  
COUP AGAINST KHOMEINI AND THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT. MADANI RESPONDED  
THAT SUCH A MOVE AT THIS TIME WOULD BE PREMATURE; IN THIS CONTEXT  
HE ALLUDED TO THE CONTINUED WEAKNESS OF THE ARMED FORCES.

3. MADANI IS DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SECURITY SITUATION  
IN KHUZESTAN PROVINCE. ALTHOUGH ARAB DISSIDENT ACTIVITY HAS  
DECLINED IN PAST WEEKS, MADANI HAS INFORMATION INDICATING THAT  
ORGANIZING ACTIVITY AMONG THE ARABS HAS GREATLY ACCELERATED  
(FIELD COMMENT: SOURCE HAD NO DETAILS ON THIS SUBJECT.)

4. ACQ: IRAN, TEHRAN (5 SEPTEMBER 1979) FIELD REPORT NO  
NIT-10,715.

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WNINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT--ORCON

COUNTRY: IRAN

SUBJECT: MILITARY AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY OF THE  
QASHQAI TRIBE (DOI: EARLY SEPTEMBER 1979)

SOURCE : A MEMBER OF THE QASHQAI TRIBE WHO IS A CONFIDANT OF  
A SENIOR QASHQAI TRIBAL LEADER WITH HIGH-LEVEL CONTACT  
IN THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN. HIS REPORTING RELIABILITY  
HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

1. ACCORDING TO QASHQAI TRIBAL LEADER KHOSROW Q A S H Q A I  
THE TRIBE AND ITS ALLIES IN FAR AND ADJACENT PROVINCES HAVE A  
TOTAL OF 20,000 LIGHT WEAPONS. THESE ARE ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY  
INDIVIDUAL ARMS, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE ALSO A FEW MORTARS AND LIGHT  
MACHINE GUNS. (FIELD COMMENT: IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THE CLAIMED  
NUMBER OF LIGHT WEAPONS IS EXAGGERATED. SEE NIT-10,658, TDFIRDB-  
315,12271-79, FOR EARLIER INFORMATION FROM THE SAME SOURCE ON  
QASHQAI ACTIVITY.) ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY DESIGNED TO FACILITATE  
THE EMPLOYMENT OF THESE FORCES IS WELL ADVANCED, AND KHOSROW  
QASHQAI BELIEVES THAT HE COULD MOVE AS MANY AS 20,000 QASHQAI AND  
ALLIED TRIBESMEN TO TEHRAN WITHIN THREE DAYS. THE ORGANIZATION  
OF THE LOGISTICS AND TRANSPORTATION ASPECTS OF SUCH A MOVE IS  
BEING CONDUCTED UNDER THE PRETEXT THAT THE QASHQAI MIGHT HAVE  
TO REACT AGAINST A THREAT TO AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH K H O M E I N I.  
IN FACT, QASHQAI WANTS TO BE PREPARED TO CONTRIBUTE MILITARY  
FORCE TO KHOMEINI'S OVERTHROW WHEN THE TIME IS RIGHT.

2. THE POLITICAL PROGRAM OF THE QASHQAI FORCES LOYAL TO  
KHOSROW QASHQAI CALLS FOR CONSOLIDATION OF CONTACTS IN THE IRANIAN  
MILITARY; THEY SEEK ALSO TO ESTABLISH AN ALLIANCE WITH SECULAR  
POLITICIANS SUCH AS THE YOUNGER GENERATION IN THE NATIONAL FRONT.  
(SOURCE COMMENT: KHOSROW QASHQAI IS HIGHLY IMPRESSED BY SEYED  
J A V A D I, REGARDING HIS POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AS COMPATIBLE  
WITH THE INTERESTS OF BOTH THE TRIBESMEN AND THE IRANIAN NATION  
.....ENVISAGES A REGIME SIMILAR IN POLICY LINE TO THAT OF  
.....PRIME MINISTER  
.....M O S S A D E G.) FORMER PRIME MINISTER  
.....B A K H T I A R HAS RECENTLY INDICATED CONTACT WITH  
.....THE LATTER BELIEVES THAT IT WOULD BE IMPRUDENT TO .....

WHIT BAKHTIAR

3. (FIELD COMMENT: SOURCE IS A PARTISAN OF KHOSROW QASHQAI...  
...IT HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO CONFIRM THE ACCURACY OF HIS ....  
.....THAT SUBSTANTIALLY THE ENTIRE QASHQAI TRIBE IS LOYAL  
...KHOSROW.)

4. ACQ: IRAN, TEHRAN (5 SEPTEMBER 1979) FIELD REPORT  
.....

5. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AT TEHRAN (CHARGE ONLY) SENT  
TO AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, ISLAMABAD, JIDDA, KARACHI, KUWAIT,  
NEW DELHI, TEL AVIV. (CHIEFS OF MISSION ONLY)  
REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND  
METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT  
RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS. DISSEMINA-  
TION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR. RVW  
....SEP 99 DRV D9C.1. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER.  
ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL  
DOCUMENT.  
S E C R E T



REPORT CLASS SECRET - UNINTEL - NOFORN - NOCONTRACT - ORCON

COUNTRY: IRAN

SUBJECT: BAKHTIAR EFFORTS TO REGENERATE SUPPORT IN IRAN  
(DOI: SEPTEMBER-EARLY OCTOBER 1979)

SOURCE: A MEMBER OF THE QASHQAI TRIBE WHO IS A CONFIDANT OF A SENIOR QASHQAI TRIBAL LEADER WITH HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS IN THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN. HIS REPORTING RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

1. QASHQAI TRIBAL LEADER KICROW QASHQAI HAS RECEIVED A SERIES OF MESSAGES, TRANSMITTED IN WRITTEN NOTES AND BY WORD OF MOUTH, FROM SHAHPOUR BAKHTIARI. THE PURPOSE OF THESE MESSAGES IS TO SOLICIT QASHQAI SUPPORT FOR BAKHTIARI'S EFFORT TO BUILD AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE ISLAMIC REGIME DOMINATED BY AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI. (SOURCE COMMENT: QASHQAI SAID THE LAST NOTE FROM BAKHTIARI ARRIVED DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF OCTOBER.)

2. BAKHTIARI'S COMMUNICATIONS TO QASHQAI CLAIM THAT SUPPORT HAS BEEN PLEDGED BY MODERATE CLERGY INCLUDING AYATOLLAH HAJI ABOLKASSEM ADAMI AND BY ELEMENTS IN THE MILITARY AT ALL LEVELS WITH OFFICER CORPS. BAKHTIARI ALSO CLAIMED SUPPORT FROM ALL THE ETHNIC MINORITIES, EXPLICITLY INCLUDING THE IRAQI ARABS. (SOURCE COMMENT: QASHQAI SAID HE REGARDS SHAHPOUR BAKHTIARI AS POLITICALLY TOO ASTUTE TO HAVE MADE ANY COMMITMENT TO THE BAKHTIARI PROGRAM. HE SAID HE DOUBTS THE ACCURACY OF BAKHTIARI'S CLAIMS TO SUPPORT IN IRAN, AND THAT HE BELIEVES BAKHTIARI IS INDULGING THE NORMAL HUMAN TENDENCY TO OVERESTIMATE RESIDUAL SUPPORT INSIDE THE COUNTRY.)

3. BAKHTIARI HAS OFFERED THE QASHQAI TRIBE "UNLIMITED" FINANCIAL SUPPORT. HE HAS GUARANTEED THE IMMEDIATE AVAILABILITY OF UP TO 500 MILLION RIALS (APPROXIMATELY 150 MILLION U.S. DOLLARS AT THE FREE MARKET RATE). (SOURCE COMMENT: QASHQAI HAS SAID HE IS AS SCEPTICAL OF THE OFFER OF FINANCIAL AID AS HE IS OF BAKHTIARI'S CLAIMS TO SUPPORT INSIDE IRAN. IN GENERAL HE THINKS

SECRET 121714Z OCT 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH 13 OCT 79 24Z

CITE WASHINGTON 531289. SECTION 1 OF 2.

TO: TEHRAN.

FROM: WE/IRAN/R INFO DCNE/SAO, WE/INTFL, DPDS/EG/DDO/CS

SUBJECT: UNINTEL - GRADES AND COMMENTS FOR REPORTS.

1. FOLLOWING ARE THE GRADES AND COMMENTS FOR SEPTEMBER NIT'S 10,710 THROUGH 10,720 REVIEWED 10 OCTOBER 1979.

OBJECTIVE: S.1.3

RATING: 5

FIELD NO NIT-10,713 OPACT SDROTTER

DISSEM NO: TDFIRDB-315/15613-79, 6 SEPT 1979

UNILATERAL, SOURCE SDROTTER/4, FULL CONTROLS

SUBJECT: MILITARY AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONAL

ACTIVITY OF THE QASHQAI TRIBE

COMMENT: THERE IS CONTINUING INTEREST IN REPORTING ON THE QASHQAI, THEIR ORGANIZATION, FACTIONS, LEADERS, LOYALTISS, ARMS ACQUISITION, AND ACTIVITY. ACCORDING TO SDRPFR/1, THE QASHQAI ARE THE ONLY TRIBE WHICH CAN MOUNT SIGNIFICANT OPPOSITION ACTIVITY (ASIDE FROM THE KURDS); HE DISCOUNTS THE BAKHTIARI. REPORT WAS USED IN ACST BRIEF.

OBJECTIVE: S.1.3

RATING: 5

FIELD NO NIT-10,715 NO OPACT

DISSEM NO: TDFIRDB-315/15595-79, 6 SEPT 1979

UNILATERAL, SOURCE SDROTTER/4, FULL CONTROLS

SUBJECT: POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND SECURITY CONCERNS

OF KHUZESTAN GOVERNOR MADANI

COMMENT: THERE IS CONTINUING INTEREST IN REPORTING ON MADANI AND ATTITUDES OF KEY FIGURES TOWARD HIM. HE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN FOLLOWUP REPORTING ON MADANI'S INFORMATION INDICATING THAT ORGANIZING ACTIVITY AMONG THE ARABS HAS GREATLY INCREASED. REPORT WAS USED IN ACST BRIEF.

SDROTTER INTEL

REF: A. TEHRAN 54473 (NIT-10,767)  
B. TEHRAN 54472 (NIT-10,768)  
TEHRAN 54144

AT 13 OCTOBER MEETING, SDROTTER/4 (R/4) SAID HIS PEOPLE ARE IN TOUCH WITH ARAB DISSIDENTS WHO ALSO SERVE AT LEAST OCCASIONALLY AS WEAPONS PURVEYORS TO THE NON-ARAB TRIBES IN THE SOUTH. HE SAID HE WANTS TO HELP US BUT THAT HE NOT IN POSITION TO BROKER OF THESE CONTACTS. WE SAID WE WOULD SEE AND ASKED HIM ALSO FOR LOCATIONS, ORGAN AND AS MUCH OF AN ASSESSMENT AS HE CAN P THAT THEY WOULD BE AMENABLE TO R/4 SAID HE WILL ASSESS

WILL MAKE THAT

R/4 ALSO EXPECTS TO SEE MUSTAFA CHAMRAN THIS WEEK (HIS PROSPECTS DEPEND ON TIMING OF CHAMRAN'S RETURN FROM KURDISTAN). WE LEVIED REQUIREMENTS DEALING WITH MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION AND WITH PERSONAL ASSESSMENT.

4. R/4 ASKED, AS HE USUALLY DOES, WHAT HE AND HIS PEOPLE SHOULD DO. WE REPLIED, AS USUAL, THAT WHATEVER MAY BE THE DEFECTS OF LIFE UNDER KHOMEINI, WE ARE NOT GOING TO ENCOURAGE ANY ACTIVITY WHOSE END RESULT MIGHT VERY WELL MAKE THE

ION, SOUNDING AS USUAL  
THE NARROWER CONTEXT  
HE THOUGHT HE SHOULD DO  
ING THE TRIBE. WE SAID  
MUCH IF THE TRIBE HAD  
SUCH A MOVE; R/4 SETTLED

FILE: 201-063527. RVW 14 OCT 99 DRV D2C.1. ALL SECRET.

REPORT CLASS S E C 2 --WNINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT--ORCON  
COUNTRY: IRAN

SUBJECT: COMMENTS OF KHOSROW QASHQAI ON SENIOR IRANIAN OFFICIALS AND ON QASHQAI TRIBE POLITICAL ACTIVITY (OCT 1979)

SOURCE: A MEMBER OF THE QASHQAI TRIBE WHO IS A CONFIDANT OF A SENIOR QASHQAI TRIBAL LEADER WITH HIGH-LEVEL CONTACT IN THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN. HIS REPORTING RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

1. QASHQAI TRIBAL LEADER KHOSROW QASHQAI SAID IN MID-OCTOBER 1979 THAT, OF THE FIVE MOST INFLUENTIAL LAYMEN IN THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN (PGOI), HE REGARDS ONLY ONE AS BEING A CONVINCED REVOLUTIONARY. THIS IS MUSTAFA CHAMRAN, MINISTER OF DEFENSE. (SOURCE COMMENT: QASHQAI SAID HE HAD NOT SEEN CHAMRAN IN ABOUT TEN YEARS AND COULD NOT BE CERTAIN THAT HIS IDEOLOGICAL FERVOR HAD SURVIVED THROUGH THIS PERIOD.) QASHQAI SAID THAT FOREIGN MINISTER ABRAHIM YAZDI, IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER SADEGH TABATABA'I AND NATIONAL ARE ESSENTIALLY OPPORTUNISTS, MORE CONCERNED WITH THE ACQUISITION AND EXERCISE OF POWER THAN WITH THE TRANSFORMATION OF IRANIAN SOCIETY ON THE BASIS OF SOME COHERENT POLITICAL PROGRAM. QASHQAI EXPRESSED PARTICULAR CONTEMPT FOR GOJBZADEH, WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS FOR SALE TO ANYONE WHO PROVIDES HIM THE LUXURIES AND PERQUISITES HE CRAVES.

2. OF YAZDI, QASHQAI SAID THAT HE IS MORE COMPLICATED THAN GOJBZADEH, VERY AMBITIOUS AND DEFINITELY NOT A REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGUE. KHOSROW SAID THAT HE REGARDS TABATABA'I AS MOTIVATED BY SELF-INTEREST AS MUCH AS THE OTHERS; HE SAID THAT HE REGARDS YAZDI AS A B B A G H I A N AS THE OTHER MOST INFLUENTIAL LAYMEN IN THE GOVERNMENT AND THAT HE DOES NOT THINK HIM TO BE MORE REVOLUTIONARY THAN, FOR EXAMPLE, SADEGH. KHOSROW ADDED THAT HE REGARDS ALL FIVE OF THESE OFFICIALS AS TOTALLY DEPENDENT ON AYATULLAH RUHOLLAH KHOMEINI FOR THEIR POSITIONS OF INFLUENCE, SAYING THAT, AS LONG-TIME EXILES,

THEY HAVE NO PERSONAL CONSTITUTIONS INSIDE IRAN.

THEY HAVE NO PERSONAL CONSTITUTIONS INSIDE THE COUNTRY. HE CLAIMED  
S. QASHGARI SAID THAT HE CONTINUES TO DEVELOP CONTACTS FOR  
THE QASHGARI TRIBE IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE COUNTRY. HE CLAIMED  
THAT NEW CONTACTS HAVE BEEN MADE LONG BOTH ACTIVE DUTY AND  
RESERVED PERIPER MILITARY OFFICERS. HE SAID THAT CONTACT  
WITH QANDHAR FORCES CHIEF OF STAFF MAI KHALAFI AND THAT  
THE PURPOSE OF THE RELATIONS IS TO PREPARE FOR CONTINGENCIES  
SUCH AS THE DEATH OF DISABILITY. QASHGARI SAID THAT  
FALLAHI HAS NEVER EXPLICITLY INDICATED HOSTILITY TO KHOMEINI  
AND THE ISLAMIC STYLE OF GOVERNMENT.

4. QASHGAI SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD QUIETLY BUT  
FORMALLY CANCELLED ORDERS FOR THE ARMS AND AMMUNITION OF THE QASHGAI  
TRIBE. HE SAID THAT HE HAD WRITTEN A LETTER TO COMRADE IN THE  
ORDER WAS PUBLISHED, ARGUING THAT THE SECURITY OF THE QASHGAI  
AREA IS BEST SERVED BY ALLOWING THE TRIBESMEN TO KEEP THEIR  
ARMS. ACCORDING TO QASHGAI, THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL  
ORDERED THE GOVERNMENT IN EARLY 1979 NOT TO PURSUE IT  
ANNOUNCED INTENTION TO TRY TO DISARM THE QASHGAI. (SOURCE  
COMMENT: QASHGAI ESTIMATED THAT MORE THAN 20 PERCENT OF THE  
QASHGAI WOULD HAVE CONSENTED TO DISARM THEIR ARMS WITHOUT  
FIGHT.) (FIELD COMMENT: QASHGAI HAVE BEEN PERFERING  
THE CAMPAIGN TO RECOVER UNARMED WEAPONS ANNOUNCED BY  
ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY PROSECUTOR OF THE VIOLENCE WHICH  
FOLLOWED THE CLOSING OF THE LIBERATION NEWSPAPER "AYANDEGAN"  
MID-AUGUST 1979.) (FIELD REPORT NO. 1579)

5. ACTS: IRAN, TEHRAN (14 OCTOBER 1979) FIELD REPORT NO.  
NIT-10,788. DEFENSE ATTACHE AT TEHRAN.

6. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY, OFFENSE ATTACHE AT TAMPAR.  
SENT TO AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, ISRAEL, JIDDA, KARACHI, KUWAIT,  
NEW DELHI, TEL AVIV.

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND  
METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE--FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT  
RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OF DISSEM/CONSULTANTS--DISSEMINATION  
CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR. PV  
EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY RECEIVING OFFICES.  
1. OCT 99 DPM 19G.1. CLASSIFIED BY [REDACTED] CONTROLS OF OVERALL  
ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION  
DOCUMENTS  
CLASS SECRET

~~NO INTEL - NO FORN - NO COMINT - NO CRIM~~

OF SAHRAI LEADER ON HIS MEETING WITH KHOMEINI.  
CURRENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS (DO): LATE OCTOBER

MEMBER OF THE QASHQAI TRIBE WHO IS A CONFIDANT OF A SENIOR QASHQAI TRIBAL LEADER WITH HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS IN THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN. HIS REPORTING RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

2. SPEAKING IN LATE OCTOBER 1978, QASHGAI TRIBAL LEADER KHOSROW M A D A N I SAID HE HAD HAD A PRIVATE MEETING AT HIS OWN INITIATIVE WITH MUHAMMAD RUMOLLAH RUMOLLAH M A D A N I ON 23 OCTOBER. HE SAID HIS MESSAGE TO KHOMENI REQUESTING THE MEETING HAD ALLUDED TO THE CONDUCT OF SOME CLERGYMEN, AND THAT HE ELABORATED ON THIS THEME DURING THEIR MEETING. HE SAID KHOMENI LISTENED, AND WAS CORDIAL THROUGHOUT THE MEETING, BUT DID NOT REPLY TO THE COMPLAINTS. (SOURCE COMMENT: QASHGAI DID NOT SAY WHAT, IF ANY, SPECIFIC CASES HE HAD PRESENTED TO KHOMENI.) KHOMENI REFERRED TO THE SITUATION IN KHUZESTAN, PRAISING GOVERNOR AMIR M A D A N I FOR HIS WORK THERE. HE ASKED QASHGAI TO ENLIST HIS TRIBE'S RESOURCES TO HELP MADANI CONTROL THE SECURITY SITUATION IN KHUZESTAN. (SOURCE COMMENT: MADANI HAD SEEN KHOMENI ON 24 OCTOBER.)

2. ACCORDING TO QASHGAI, THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS (PASDARAN) FROM BANDAR ANZALI AFTER THE RECENT DISTURBANCES THERE WAS ORDERED BY MADANI. HE SAID THAT THIS INCIDENT HAS INTENSIFIED THE PASDARAN LEADERSHIP'S RESENTMENT OF MADANI, WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY IMPOSED FIRM CONTROL ON PASDARAN ACTIVITY IN KHUZESTAN. SOURCE COMMENTS: BASHARI SEEMED TO BE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT DEFENSE MINISTER MUSTAFAEZ CAN A WAR A. 12 IS ALSO HOSTILE TO MADANI BUT OFFERED NO EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF HIS BELIEF. (FIELD COPY OF THE FRONT OF BANDAR ANZALI, FORMERLY BANDAR BAKHAYI, WAS PLACED UNDER FIRM CONTROL AFTER A SERIES OF CLASHES BETWEEN FISHERMEN AND REVOLUTIONARY AUTHORITIES. THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE PASDARAN IS REPORTED IN THE PRESS.)



EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

SDROTTER/4. KHOSROW QASHQAI.  
QASHQAI TRIBAL LEADER. RESIDES  
SHIRAZ. MARITAL STATUS UNKNOWN.  
AGE 50-55. RESIDED W. GERMANY AND  
U.S. BEFORE REVOLUTION.

Met in Tehran approximately every three to four weeks, either in his hotel room or picked up by car. Used Sheraton and Inter-Continental hotels.

Purpose of Contact: 1) To acquire sources of information on Khuzestani Arabs, including organization, leadership, and any involvement with or support from Iraq; 2) Information on the security situation in Fars and Khuzestan Provinces; 3) Political plans of Admiral Madani.

Re 1): In October, Mr. Q said he had been informed about two Khuzestani Arabs, smugglers by trade, who might be able to provide the desired information. Mr. Q was to provide names and other pertinent data in November. Re 2): Mr. Q provided information on his efforts both to guard against threats to the Revolution and to avoid the stationing of Pasdaran and Komitehs among the Qashqai people. Described efforts to acquire friends for the Qashqai tribe among military officers and in the person of Adm. Madani. Re 3) Mr. Q described Madani's interest in seeking the Presidency of the Republic under the new constitution.

Mr. Q described the weekly newspaper he wanted to sponsor in cooperation with Admiral Madani. Most of the information involved the reasons for continued postponement of publication, primarily the absence from Iran of the proposed editor (name not known). Paper was to be published in Tehran in about 70,000 copies per edition. We were interested, in principle, in



EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

SDROTTER/4.

supporting a publication which would seek to broaden the Revolution's base of support and, if possible, promote reconciliation between Iran and the US, ~~XX~~ but as of 4 November no support for this venture had been offered or requested.

Payment: None. A U.S. visa was obtained for Mr. Q's sister.

Kareem Sanjabi:

The documents indicate that the C. I. A. was interested in talking to Sanjabi on the condition that he would not subsequently insist on meeting the Security Council or the White House. With the approval of the U. S. State Department, the C. I. A. intended to send one of their agents in the guise of a high ranking official from the State Department's special desk dealing with Iranian affairs to meet him, but due to his ill-health this meeting did not materialize until Shahrivar 20 (September 11). The subsequent telegram about Sanjabi is dated Aban 8 (October 30), and as the documents referred to in the above-mentioned document could not be traced materialization or non-materialization of this meeting is not known. The documents in this section indicate that Sam Sanjabi, the son of Karim, was working as a contact for the C. I. A. and his father himself had a very close association with the C. I. A.



AUG 25 04 38Z

SECRET 012001Z JUL 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 488014.

TO: IMMEDIATE FR/SAN FRANCISCO INFO TEHRAN.

WNINTEL RYBAT AJAJA TORRES

REF: FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25077

1. HCS IS INTERESTED IN TALKING WITH KARIM SANJABI PRO-  
VIDING SANJABI IS NOT MAKING SEPARATE OVERTURES TO SZO SECURITY  
COUNCIL/WHITE HOUSE WHICH WE WOULD IN EFFECT BE DUPLICATING.  
HANE INFORMED STATE DEPARTMENT OF SANJABI'S ARRIVAL AND EFFECTED  
PRELIMINARY COORDINATION RE MEETING HIM. STATE WAS UNAWARE OF  
SANJABI'S PLANS TO TRAVEL U.S. FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT.

2. WILL ADVISE RE IDENTITY OF HCS OFFICER TO PARTICIPATE  
COVER WOULD BE SENIOR U.S. GOVERNMENT INTELLIGENCE SPECIALIST  
ON IRAN. AGREE RE VENUE AND TIMING PROPOSED PARA TWO RIF.

3. FILE: 201-461442. RVW 31 JUL 99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

SECRET

BT  
#7956

SECRET 09101Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 53879

TO: PRIORITY FR/SAN FRANCISCO INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR

WNINTEL RYBAT AJAJA FORRES

REF: FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25..2

1. AGREE SANJABI WOULD PROBABLY USE INFO ON YAZDI  
CITIZENSHIP TO DISCREDIT HIM. THIS WOULD BE CONTRARY TO STATION  
AND MISSION UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT OUR OBJECTIVES ARE WITH  
RESPECT TO PGOI, AND WE THINK IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE  
TO PROVIDE ANY SUCH INFO, REGARDLESS OF ITS PROVENANCE.

2. FILE: 201-096... RVW 9 AUG 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET  
SECRET

1 AUG 79

SECRET 102130Z AUG 79 STAFF

NOTE DIRECTOR 492905.

TO: PRIORITY FR/SAN FRANCISCO INFO TEHRAN.

UNINTEL RYBAT AJAJA FORRES

REFS: A. TEHRAN 53879  
B. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25140

1. CONCUR REF A REGARDING INAPPROPRIATENESS OF REACTION  
FULFILLING SANJABI REQUEST. CASE SHOULD NOT PUT ITSELF IN  
POSITION OF AIDING SANJABI ON THIS.

2. FILE: 201-0901440. RFW 10AUG99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SICH.T.  
SECRET  
BT  
41853

P

SECRET

SECRET 1112355Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25140

TO: DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.

UNINTEL RYBAT AJAJA FORRES

REFS: A. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25140  
B. TEHRAN 53879

1. KARIM SANJABI IS RECOVERING AT THE HOME OF HIS SON, SAM  
SANJABI, IN CHICO, CALIFORNIA. UNFORTUNATELY, HE HAS AN UNDIAGNOSED  
INFECTION WITH HIGH FEVER WHICH HAS NOT YET RESPONDED TO ANTIBIOTICS  
AND IS IN NO CONDITION FOR AN INTERVIEW. SAM ESTIMATES AT LEAST A  
WEEK MORE OF TREATMENT AND REST WILL BE NECESSARY BEFORE KARIM IS  
FIT TO TALK. WILL ADVISE.

2. SAM PERSISTS IN REQUEST FOR INFO ON YAZDI'S NATURALIZATION.  
WE TOLD HIM DOCUMENTS SUCH AS HE REQUESTED WERE PROTECTED BY THE  
PRIVACY ACT. SAM SAID HE WOULD NOT FURTHER DOCUMENTATION, ONLY THE BASIC  
FACTS OF DATE AND PLACE OF YAZDI'S NATURALIZATION, WHICH HE ARGUES  
SHOULD BE MATTER OF PUBLIC RECORD. IF THERE IS PUBLIC RECORD  
INFORMATION, SUGGEST HOW OBTAIN IT. CASE TO SAM SANJABI TO  
EASE INTRODUCTION TO HIS OFFICER.

3. FILE: 201-0901440. RFW 15 SEP 79 DRV D9C.1 BY 033151. ALL  
SECRET  
SECRET  
BT  
49027

310ct79 09 05z

SECRET 301700Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25591

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR, TEHRAN INFO FR/LOS ANGELES.

WNINTFL AJAJA

REFS: A. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25330  
B. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25450 (NOT SENT TEHRAN)

1. ACCORDING TO HIS SON, SAM, DR. KAPIM SANJABI RECEIVED A CALL FROM ALI ARDALAN (A RELATIVE, A KURD, AND PRESENT MINISTER OF FINANCE) SEVERAL DAYS AGO INVITING HIS EARLY RETURN TO IRAN. DR. SANJABI LEFT CALIFORNIA 28 OCTOBER \*FOR A BRIEF STOP WITH HIS OTHER SON IN ILLINOIS BEFORE PROCEEDING TO EUROPE TO SEE IRANIAN EXILE CONTACTS THERE. HE IS EXPECTED TO RETURN TO TEHRAN ON OR ABOUT 7 NOVEMBER.

2. SAM, ON BASIS OF TALKS WITH HIS FATHER, SPECULATES REASONS FOR SUMMONS MAY BE:

A. TO AID THE GOVERNMENT IN DEALING WITH THE KURDISH PROBLEM THROUGH HIS AUTHORITY WITH THE SANJABI TRIBE.

B. TO ASSIST THE FALTERING BAZARGAN GOVT OR ITS SUCCESSOR IN A POSITION SUCH AS CHIEF OF THE CABINET. KARIM SANJABI SAID HE WOULD REFUSE ANY CABINET POST UNLESS HE WERE GUARANTEED THE AUTHORITY TO GO WITH THE TITLE. HE WANTS NO REPEAT OF HIS SHORT TERM AS FOREIGN MINISTER.

3. DR. SANJABI'S HEALTH IS MUCH IMPROVED AND HE GAINED A LITTLE WEIGHT WHILE RESTING IN CHICO.

4. SAM PROMISED TO INFORM US OF ANY NEW DEVELOPMENTS.

5. FILE: 201-0951442. RVW 30OCT99 DRV D9C1 BY 033151.

ALL SECRET.  
SECRET

BT  
#2349

REPORT CLASS: SECRET--WNINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT--DRCON  
COUNTRY: IRAN

SUBJECT: DARIOUSH FOROUHAR'S REMARKS ON IRANIAN CABINET SHUFFLE  
(OOI: 29 SEPTEMBER 1979)

SOURCE: A GENERALLY RELIABLE IRANIAN BUSINESS EXECUTIVE.

1. ON 29 SEPTEMBER 1979, DARIOUSH FOROUHAR SAID THAT HE HAD ACCEPTED THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO POSITION IN THE NEW IRANIAN CABINET BECAUSE THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL WANTED THE BENEFIT OF HIS PRESTIGE IN THE CABINET. FOR HIS PART, FOROUHAR DID NOT WANT TO CONTINUE AT THE HEAD OF ANY SPECIFIC MINISTRY FOR FEAR OF BEING ACCUSED AND INVESTIGATED AT SOME TIME IN THE FUTURE, LIKE HASSAN NAZARI, FORMER CHIEF OF THE NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY. (FIELD COMMENT: PRIOR TO THE CABINET SHAKEUP, FOROUHAR WAS MINISTER OF LABOR.)

2. FOROUHAR SAID THAT THE FORMER MINISTER OF SCIENCE AND HIGHER EDUCATION, DR. ALI SHARIATI-MADARI, WAS NOT ON THE LIST OF MINISTERS TO BE CHANGED ORIGINALLY, BUT SHARIATI-MADARI HAD SUBMITTED HIS OWN RESIGNATION ON 27 SEPTEMBER IN PROTEST AGAINST THE OTHER CABINET CHANGES. (SOURCE COMMENT: DR. ALI SHARIATI-MADARI IS A DISTANT RELATIVE OF THE WELL-KNOWN AYATOLLAH HAZEM SHARIATI-MADARI.)

3. ACQ: IRAN, TEHRAN (1 OCTOBER 1979) FIELD REPORT NO. 411-10,763.

4. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AND DEFENSE ATTACHE AT TEHRAN, SENT TO AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, ISLAMABAD, JIDDA, KARACHI, KUWAIT, MANAMA, NEW DELHI, TEL AVIV.

REPORT CLASS: SECRET--WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONSULTANTS. DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR. RVW 1 OCT 99 DRV D9C1. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.  
SECRET

TEHRAN 54368 (MIT-10,753)

1. SDVALID/I (V/I) OBTAINED REF DIRECTLY FROM DARIOUSH FOROUHAR ON 29 SEPTEMBER, WHEN HE MET HIM AT HOME OF HIS FRIEND JAVAD VATANI. VATANI AND FOROUHAR ARE OLD FRIENDS BECAUSE THEY WERE IN PRISON TOGETHER IN THE SHAH'S ERA.

2. FOROUHAR ALSO MENTIONED THAT THE FOLLOWING PERSONS WILL RECEIVE DIPLOMATIC APPOINTMENTS:

SARAF YAZI -- CHARGE IN BANGLADESH

ALI RASOULI -- CHARGE IN SENEGAL

NADER SHAHSAD -- CHARGE IN ROME *✓ already confirmed*

GHASEM EFTEXARI -- CHARGE IN BRASILIA

AHMAD HOSSAINI FARD -- PRESS OFFICER IN EAST BERLIN

3. ACCORDING TO FOROUHAR, THE FOLLOWING PERSONS ARE ON THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL: BANI-SADR, GHOTBZADEH, AYATOLLAH KHAMENEI AND AYATOLLAH RAFSANJANI. SDVALID/I WAS NOT CERTAIN FROM FOROUHAR'S REMARKS WHETHER HE MEANT THAT THESE ARE THE ONLY PERSONS ON THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL.

Real Name: Ali Saifpur Fatemi.

Code Name: S. D. Market.

S. D. Market (Ali Saifpur Fatemi) was a professor of economics at an American university and was employed as source of information on the political matters of Iran in Azar 58 (November 1979). His secret motive in working for the C. I. A. was that America should continue to support the Iranian moderates, so that through them a solution to the political problems of Iran could be found. He was residing in America as a permanent resident and had visited Iran several times in connection with his work at the International Training Centre of Iran.

In view of the information given by another spy about S. D. Market to the C. I. A. official to the effect that in all probability the charges of embezzlement, misappropriation and corruption against Ardshir Zahidi are also directed towards him (S. D. Market), the C. I. A. considered the probable dangers threatening him and did not intend to exert more pressure on him by making further contact.

4 Apr 79 04 55z

SECRET 140421Z APR 79 STAFF  
CITE DIRECTOR 419468. SECTION 1 OF 2  
TO: ROME INFO TEHRAN.

UNINTEL RYBAT AWAJA BOHANN.

REF: TEHRAN 92649

1. PER REF REQUEST, FOLLOWING ARE SUMMARIES OF CASES  
LAUTSCH MAY BE EXPECTED TO HANDLE IN TEHRAN:

E. SOMARKEI/1 (M/1) AGE 43. PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS  
AT U.S. UNIVERSITY. TRAVELLED FREQUENTLY TO TEHRAN TO WORK  
WITH IRAN CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION CITIES. AN  
IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE LHO WAS ACTIVE IN NON-COMMUNIST ANTI-SHIA  
GROUPS OUTSIDE IRAN UNTIL LATE 1960'S. WAS RECRUITED DEC 7  
AS SOURCE OF INFO ON IRANIAN POLITICAL SITUATION. HAS  
IMPRESSIVE RANGE OF CONTACTS IN GOVERNMENT, NATIONAL FRONT  
AND MODERATE CIRCLES WHO HE SEES TO OBTAIN INFO ON LOCAL  
DEVELOPMENTS. MOTIVATION IS STRONG BELIEF THAT USG MUST CONTINUE  
TO SUPPORT IRAN WHILE MODERATES TRY TO FIND SOLUTION TO SITUATION.  
AN UNPAID AGENT ALTHOUGH APPROVAL GRANTED JAN 79 FOR ACCOMMODATION  
EXCHANGE OR LOAN OF TRAIL: 300,000 TO PAY LOCAL ICE STAFF.  
MEETINGS INVOLVE MAX OR CAR PICKUPS, RESTAURANT MEETINGS, ETC.  
USE OF COMMO GEAR UNRECORDED. HOWEVER UNIT NO LONGER IN HIS  
POSSESSION (STATION RETRIEVED IT AS OF 12 MARCH 79 DUE LOCAL  
SECURITY SITUATION). SOMARKEI/1 IS INTELLIGENT AND ARTICULATE  
MAN WHOSE PREVIOUS REPORTING HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIATED. SINCE  
MANY OF HIS FRIENDS HAVE BEEN JAILED AND IN SOME CASES EXECUTED  
SOMARKEI/1, A FRANK PLANS TO DEPART TEHRAN AS SOON AS GOVERNMENT  
ALLOWS IRANIAN MALES TO LEAVE. HAS AGREED TO MEET WITH ATTACHÉ  
IN U.S.

2. NO FILE. RVW 13 APR 79 DRV DSC.1. ALL SECRET.  
SECRET

E. SOMARKEI/1 (M/1) CONTINUES TO PLAN TO LEAVE IRAN  
AS SOON AS HE IS ABLE - HE HOPES BY EARLY APRIL 79.  
M/1 WILL EXPECT A CALL FROM GLEGOROFF IF M/1 STILL HERE  
AFTER GLEGOROFF'S ARRIVAL. IF M/1 ABLE LEAVE IN NEAR FUTURE,  
WE HAVE ARRANGED TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH HIM IN THE U.S.  
THROUGH HIS WIFE. WE HAVE TENTATIVELY AGREED THAT M/1 WILL TRAVEL  
TO WASHINGTON FOR A THOROUGH DEBRIEFING SOON AFTER HIS ARRIVAL IN  
THE U.S.

3. FOR THE RECORD, M/1 HAS CHANGED HIS OFFICE LOCATION.  
NEW OFFICE TELEPHONE AND LOCATION OF OFFICE IS IDENT.

A. FILE: DEFER. RVW 26 MAR 79. DRV DSC.1. ALL SECRET.  
SECRET

26/10/62 MAR 79 STAFF  
HON 5/25/13 (PLANTING NOTING)

PHILIP RAY DIRECTOR.

PHILIP RAY DIRECTOR

TEHRAN 52514

IRAN CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION.

PHONE 51 623-043  
623-734

OFFICE LOCATED AT NORTHEAST CORNER, INTERSECTION OF  
TAKHT-E-AVUS AND SHAH ABAS. BUILDING HAS 5 FLOORS.  
SIGNS ON FRONT ENTRANCE. (A BANK OCCUPIES GROUND FL.)  
R/W 26 MAR 69 DRU DGC SECRET  
SECRET

848127 h

IR E TITLASH MAY TO STAFF  
TEHRAN 52514 (ALEXOROFF ACTION)  
DIRECTION.

PHILIP RAY DIRECTOR


1. NEARLOTTE ELICITED FROM SORIGHT/1 - MAY THAT SORIGHT  
IS LYING VERY LOW IN TEHRAN PRIMARILY BECAUSE HE FEARS LOCAL  
RAMIFICATIONS OF HIS PAST RELATIONSHIP WITH ARDESHIR ZAHEDI.  
R/1 CLAIMS M/1 HAD BEEN GIVEN MONEY BY ZAHEDI FOR CERTAIN AGRICULTURAL  
PROJECTS WHICH NEVER GOT OFF GROUND. THERE ARE SUSPICIONS REGARDING WHAT  
HAPPENED TO THE MONEY. R/1 IS OF OPINION THAT M/1 WANTS TO ESCAPE TO UK.

2. AS DESIRABLE AS IT WOULD BE TO TRY TO GET M/1 BACK IN  
REPORTING RELATIONSHIP, STATION CAN SYMPATHIZE WITH M/1'S WORRY  
AND IS RELUCTANT TO PRESS HIM. CRIMES OF ALLEGED "CORRUPTION"  
AND SERVICE TO THE LUMINARIES OF FORMER REGIME ARE UNDEED  
SERIOUS, SOMETIMES TERMINAL. UNLESS HAS BELIEVES WE SHOULD  
LEAN HARD ON M/1 TO RESUME RELATIONSHIP. WE INCLINED TO HONOR  
M/1'S JUDGMENT THAT CONTACTS TOO RISKY FOR HIM NOW.

3. FILE: 201  
SECRET.  
SECRET

R/W 17 MAY 69 DRU DGC ALL





CLASSIFIED CLASSIFIED CLASSIFIED  
**TELEGRAM** Foreign Service of the  
 United States of America

20 faw OUTGOING Embassy THERAN

CONFIDENTIAL  
 Change: Classification Control: 9/589  
 ACTION: SECRETARY WASHINGTON 517 Date: SEPT. 28, 1963  
 REF.: (a) Deptel 843 and Habeltel 957 of May 15, 1962  
 (b) Habeltel 506 and Deptel 221, Sept., 1963  
 (c) Para. 5 Dept. CMY 2, Sept. 6, 1963.

Believe time has come once more for deportation Iranian students All Seifpur Farhat and Sadeh GOTTENBERG on ground that they are in United States without valid Iranian passports. As Department aware these students are deeply involved in political activities against Iranian Government and there appears to be good legal case against them.

When this matter last discussed as per reference (a), the Department asked Embassy obtain assurance from Prime Minister that in case they returned to Iran they would not be prosecuted for any acts committed up to that time. Subsequently Embassy as per Habeltel 957 did obtain such assurances from Shah himself. We have no reason to doubt continued validity those assurances and could if necessary remind Government of them.

Timeliness of proposed action with Justice Department is suggested by recent incident with student agitators involving Iranian Foreign Minister as per Ref (b). Although Embassy has received no evidence that they were personally involved in this latest disturbance, we strongly feel that action on Nafar and Gottendeh would have salutary effect on other Iranian students

| in US.                              | INT.                                |
|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |

GP-4  
 CONFIDENTIAL  
 Classification

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
 PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

CLASSIFIED

CLASSIFIED

CLASSIFIED

**TELEGRAM**Foreign Service  
United States of America

OUTGOING

Charge:

CONFIDENTIAL  
Classification

Control: 9/389

-2-

Date:

Timeliness is further suggested by recent information on IHS position contained ref (a) notably sentence that "Department has been informally told by the (Immigration and Naturalization) Service that it probably would not grant a further extension of stay to a student in such circumstances", i.e., when his Iranian passport has not been extended.

HOLMES

POL:JF/Men/est  
Sept. 28, 1963Clearance  
COMB: JF/Men (Draft)CONFIDENTIAL  
ClassificationREPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

CLASSIFIED

CLASSIFIED

CLASSIFIED

CLASSIFIED

**TELEGRAM**Foreign Service  
United States of America

10/

INCOMING AMERICAN EMBASSY TEHRAN

ACTION:  
COM-2  
LFO:  
CHAM-2  
AMB  
POL-3  
CMB-2  
OR

CONFIDENTIAL OP-4

Classification

Control: 12/399

|     | Action | Infor. | INR |
|-----|--------|--------|-----|
| DAL |        |        |     |
| LCA |        |        |     |
| AMB |        |        |     |
| JL  |        |        |     |
| LF  |        |        |     |
| FK  |        |        |     |

OAC. 26, 1963  
06:00 A.M.

FROM: DEPARTMENT

NO: 157, DECEMBER 21, 5P

Re EMTEL 317

Fatemeh and Gohbadeh were called in today to advise Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization who issued them strong warning to cease troublesome activities or face legal action to enforce departure as is normal in the case of aliens without valid passports. Warning issued in name of Attorney General, whom Commissioner described as "disappointed" that past leniency shown at his instance had not resulted in more behavior on the part of the Iranian Students' Association. Fatemeh and Gohbadeh were told that they are expected to use their influence in that association to prevent others from engaging in troublesome activities and to spread the word that any student without valid passport must control behavior or face appropriate legal action.

Indicated activities were specified as: harassment and insulting of visiting Iranian dignitaries; forced entry into Iranian diplomatic premises; and distribution of Communist literature.

Above procedure was worked out as result of letter from Secretary to Attorney General. Today's warning was issued in presence of AIA representative, who was invited to reinforce points made by Commissioner.

Unclassified cleared memo of conversation of today's session will be pouched as soon as possible. Have informed Forough of meeting, as he has frequently inquired, at Aram's request, as to action we were taking to curb student activities.

FTI. The two Iranian girls, possessing passports and justifying political activities as within their rights, nevertheless appeared shaken by seminar and impressed with evidence that there has been a change in United States Government stance toward them. They probed hard for signs of differences between State and Justice positions, but received no evidence thereof. Fatemeh has applied for change of status to permanent resident, on basis wife is naturalized U.S. citizen, but she did not press this case today;

we hope/.....

0730/19

CONFIDENTIAL OP-4

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

CLASSIFIED

FATEMEH and GOHBADAH

CLASSIFIED

May 1, 1959.

we hope to delay, if not prevent, such change of status by investigations of Communist literature distribution and ISA source of funds. End FYI.

1055 K

CONFIDENTIAL  
GILH

**CLASSIFIED CLASSIFIED CLASSIFIED CLASSIFIED**

**CLASSIFIED**

**CLASSIFIED**

**CLASSIFIED**

# TELEGRAM

United States

**OUTGOING: AMERICAN EMBASSY TEMPAH**

CONFIDENTIAL  
Classification

Control: 12/210

Date: Dec. 20, 1954  
RTD 5000

## References

ACTION: SUCCESS 595

Postal 45T

**Training Session**

When I conveyed information re:tel to Fortin today, he expressed great appreciation and asked me convey to Dept his gratitude and that of Foreign Ministry. He particularly wished have his thanks conveyed to Secretary for personally taking such construction action in this

10/14/68 case.  
CHARGE-2  
AND  
POL-3  
OCH  
CH-2  
CH-2

~~affiliated~~ : new

12/88/63

**Keywords:** *work, work environment, work engagement, work satisfaction, work stress, work strain, work-life balance, work-family balance, work-family conflict, work-family interface, work-family interface theory, work-family interface model, work-family interface research, work-family interface literature, work-family interface studies, work-family interface issues, work-family interface challenges, work-family interface solutions, work-family interface interventions, work-family interface programs, work-family interface policies, work-family interface practices, work-family interface research agenda, work-family interface research priorities, work-family interface research gaps, work-family interface research opportunities, work-family interface research directions, work-family interface research trends, work-family interface research findings, work-family interface research conclusions, work-family interface research implications, work-family interface research recommendations, work-family interface research suggestions, work-family interface research proposals, work-family interface research projects, work-family interface research grants, work-family interface research funding, work-family interface research support, work-family interface research resources, work-family interface research tools, work-family interface research methods, work-family interface research techniques, work-family interface research procedures, work-family interface research protocols, work-family interface research standards, work-family interface research guidelines, work-family interface research best practices, work-family interface research quality, work-family interface research validity, work-family interface research reliability, work-family interface research generalizability, work-family interface research applicability, work-family interface research transferability, work-family interface research replicability, work-family interface research sustainability, work-family interface research impact, work-family interface research contribution, work-family interface research significance, work-family interface research importance, work-family interface research relevance, work-family interface research timeliness, work-family interface research originality, work-family interface research novelty, work-family interface research creativity, work-family interface research innovation, work-family interface research excellence, work-family interface research distinction, work-family interface research recognition, work-family interface research honor, work-family interface research prestige, work-family interface research reputation, work-family interface research status, work-family interface research position, work-family interface research role, work-family interface research function, work-family interface research purpose, work-family interface research mission, work-family interface research vision, work-family interface research values, work-family interface research principles, work-family interface research ethics, work-family interface research integrity, work-family interface research honesty, work-family interface research transparency, work-family interface research accountability, work-family interface research responsibility, work-family interface research stewardship, work-family interface research leadership, work-family interface research management, work-family interface research governance, work-family interface research oversight, work-family interface research supervision, work-family interface research control, work-family interface research coordination, work-family interface research collaboration, work-family interface research cooperation, work-family interface research partnership, work-family interface research alliance, work-family interface research consortium, work-family interface research network, work-family interface research community, work-family interface research association, work-family interface research organization, work-family interface research institution, work-family interface research center, work-family interface research department, work-family interface research division, work-family interface research office, work-family interface research unit, work-family interface research group, work-family interface research team, work-family interface research project, work-family interface research program, work-family interface research initiative, work-family interface research effort, work-family interface research endeavor, work-family interface research venture, work-family interface research enterprise, work-family interface research undertaking, work-family interface research project, work-family interface research program, work-family interface research initiative, work-family interface research effort, work-family interface research endeavor, work-family interface research venture, work-family interface research enterprise, work-family interface research undertaking.*

JEN

ROUTING

| ROUTING |        |        |
|---------|--------|--------|
|         | Action | Infor. |
| D.L.    |        |        |
| LCA     |        |        |
| AMB     |        |        |
| JL      |        |        |
| LF      |        |        |

1998

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS DOCUMENT  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"  
ONLY OR "UNCLASSIFIED"

COPY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

COPY

Washington

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

OFFICIAL-INTERNAL

July 12, 1966

Martin F. Kern, Esquire  
Counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs  
American Embassy  
Tehran

Dear Martin:

Yesterday Ali Fatemi's attorney called to say the Immigration Service had granted Fatemi's request to change his status to that of permanent resident. This was later confirmed by I/SOA, which maintains liaison with the INS. When I mentioned our interest, for political reasons, in knowing in advance about decisions of this kind, I was told that no doubt the Special Inquiry Officer, acting in a quasi-judicial manner, simply informs the applicant once the decision is made. Fortunately, the decision was not based on a claim that Fatemi would be persecuted if he were deported to Iran. Most probably, the decision, as in similar cases, was because Fatemi has an American citizen wife and child, so when Fatemi's deportation might work a hardship.

The department continued throughout the procedure to maintain its position, originally stated in 1964, that a change of status would have an adverse effect on our relations with Iran. We were overruled by the INS which has the responsibility under the law for making decisions like this.

While this is certainly unfortunate in terms of our foreign relations, Ben Schmeyer and I believe that the Department employed every legitimate administrative resource at its command, short of claiming overriding national interest, to see to it that the responsible agency was fully aware of the foreign policy aspects of the case. We would of course be interested in learning of any reaction in Tehran.

Best regards,

Sincerely,

by I/SOA

/s/ Franklin J. Crawford  
Iranian Affairs

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
Exempt from automatic decontrol

SECRET

The Ambassador

July 19, 1966

POL - Martin Kern

INS Action on Ali FATEMI

Ali Mohammad Reif Far FATEMI, the subject of the attached letter, has been President of Iranian student organizations in the U.S. and the power behind the two nationalist oriented Iranian student publications Iran Namah and Doneshju. He has been involved in numerous anti-engine activities, notably the anti-Chen sit-in at the Iranian Embassy in Washington in January 1963 and demonstrations at the United Nations in September and October of the same year. The Iranian Embassy, which in 1961 had refused to renew Fatemi's passport because of his anti-Chen political activities in the U.S., in 1963 refused to renew his student permit.

Fatemi was born on 15 May 1935 in Isfahan and is the nephew of Prime Minister Mossadeq's Foreign Minister, Dr. Hossein Fatemi, who was executed on 10 November 1954. The Fatemi family, motivated in large measure by a desire for revenge following the execution of their kinsman, are perhaps the hardest core group of anti-Chen Iranians. Ali, a "student", is married to the former Jaleh Amire Tahmasbi (an Iranian national who became a naturalized U.S. citizen) and is resident in New Jersey.

In September 1964 the New Jersey District Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization turned down his application for a change of status to permanent resident and advised him that if he did not depart the U.S. voluntarily before October 12, 1964, his departure would be enforced. Upon receipt of the INS note, Ali Fatemi accompanied by his uncle Mesrobian Fatemi, a professor at Fairleigh Dickinson University at Madison, New Jersey, requested the assistance of New Jersey's Senator Case to stay the INS deportation order on the grounds that Fatemi would be subjected to persecution if returned to Iran. Ali Fatemi, who is also acquainted with and enjoys the friendship of Justice William Douglas and Senator Robert Kennedy, apparently was able to block the 1964 deportation efforts of the INS.

There are reports that Ali Fatemi met Ahmed Ben Bella at the United Nations in 1963 and favorably impressed the former Algerian President who invited

SECRET  
Downgraded at 12-year intervals,  
not automatically declassified.

SECRET

FATEMI, Ali Mohammad Reif Far

SECRET

-2-

him to visit Algeria. Following this meeting, the Algerian Embassy in Washington reportedly issued an Algerian passport to Ali who then went to Algeria where he reportedly underwent paramilitary training. Ali is also reported to have made several trips to Europe during 1964 and 1965 contacting various National Front and other opposition elements, but the documentation he used to travel from and re-enter the US is not known.

FOIA b 7 - Exempt from release 7/29/66

DISTRIBUTION:

- 1. Mr. - Mr. Tamm
- 2. Mr. - Mr. Tamm
- 3. Mr. - Mr. Tamm
- 4. Mr. - Mr. Tamm
- 5. Mr. - Mr. Tamm
- 6. Mr. - Mr. Tamm

SECRET

Real Name: Touraj Nasser.

Code Name: S. D. Paquin.

Touraj Nasser was a professor at the Sahrif Technical University and had contacts with the C. I. A. before the Revolution and had sent three reports to the C. I. A. till the fall of Bakhtiyar. Following the Revolution due to the security problems a time gap appeared in his relationship with the C. I. A., but after the Revolution the C. I. A. decided to reestablish contacts with him. During his telephone contact with Ganjian (code name of one of the C. I. A. agents at Tehran Station) he told him that he was a member of the purging committee of the Sharif Technical University and could not visit him in person for security reasons but would like to continue telephone contacts.

In the documents collected from the political section of the Espionage Den concerning the moderates, there is a document dated February 12/78, mentioning the meeting of Dr. Touraj Nasser with John Stempel, one of the officials of the political section.

Touraj Nasser was responsible for introducing his brother Faridun (S. D. Paquin/1) to Ganjian (a C. I. A. agent). In Mordad 1357 (July 1978) Faridun was an assistant to the Interior Minister and was his deputy in the Budget and Planning Organization. In Shahrivar 1357 (August 1978) he became an official employee of the C. I. A., and it was decided that \$750 would be deposited in his bank account every month. He supplied information about the plans and aims of the Iranian government, proceedings of the Cabinet and gave political reports. He also used to receive information from his friends in the army and other military and intelligence agencies.

MAY 79 7 40Z

SECRET 302139Z APR 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 429018.

TO: TEHRAN.

WNTTEL SDCARAWAY

1. STATION MAY WANT TO CONSIDER RECONTACT WITH SDCARAWAY/1 (C/1) (IDEN A) WHO IS PROFESSOR AT (IDEN B). C/1 IS BROTHER OF SDCPCAN/1 (P/1) AND FIRST INTRODUCED P/1 TO GANJIAN. C/1 WAS AWARE THAT P/1 HAD CONTACTS WITH GANJIAN, BUT WAS PROBABLY NOT AWARE OF EXTENT OF P/1'S COOPERATION WITH RTACTION.

2. C/1 WAS SOURCE OF THREE REPORTS ON "INDEPENDENT" (NON-NATIONAL FRONT, NON-RELIGIOUS) OPPOSITION TO THE SHAH PRIOR TO DOWNFALL OF BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT. HE WAS AWARE OF GANJIAN'S RTACTION AFFILIATION, HAD AGREED TO KEEP RELATIONSHIP CONFIDENTIAL AND DISCREET, AND ACCEPTED RECONTACT PLAN (SEE PARA THREE). LAST CONTACT WITH C/1 WAS BY TELEPHONE JUST PRIOR TO GANJIAN'S DEPARTURE. C/1 SAID THAT HE WAS MEMBER OF "COMMITTEE" AT IDEN B, AND THAT THEY WERE INVESTIGATING FORMER GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WHO HAD HAD CONNECTION WITH IDEN B. C/1 DECLINED PERSONAL MEETING BECAUSE OF SECURITY SITUATION, BUT EXPRESSED INTENTION TO MAINTAIN CONTACT BY TELEPHONE. C/1 HAD "INTELLECTUAL TENDENCY TO DEVOTE SUBSTANTIAL TIME TO GENERAL TRENDS AND FACTS OF IRANIAN POLITICS, BUT AT SAME TIME HE DID PROVIDE FACTUAL INFO OF INTEL VALUE. C/1 IN ANY CASE IMPRESSED AS BRIGHT, ARTICULATE INDIVIDUAL WITH LONG-RANGE POLITICAL INTERESTS. DEPENDING ON HIS PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, HE MAY BE WILLING TO ACCEPT CONTACT WITH RTACTION OFFICER.

3. SUBJECT REF AGREED TO RESPOND TO ANY INDIVIDUAL WHO USES KEY PHRASE "BRITISH GYPSUM". IF HE HAS FORGOTTEN PAROLE, HE SHOULD RESPOND TO ANYONE WHO IDENTIFIES SELF AS FRIEND AND COLLEAGUE OF GANJIAN (TRUE NAME). MEETING SITE SHOULD BE ARRANGED ON INITIAL CONTACT.

4. FILE: 201-0958834. RNM 30 APRIL 1979 DRV DGC.1 ALL

SECRET  
SECRET  
BT  
#3253

*Handwritten:*  
Charlotte  
What is your  
Phone

MAY 79 7 40Z

SECRET 302216Z APR 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 429028.

TO: TEHRAN.

WNTTEL

REF: DIRECTOR 429018

1. HERewith REF IDENTITIES:  
IDEN A - DR. TOURAJ N. A. E. S. E. R. I.  
IDEN B - ARTAMER TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY, PLOT 907, PHASE  
IDEN C - HOME ADDRESS: SHAHRAH GHARBI, PLOT 907, PHASE  
HOME TELEPHONE: 689228 RPT 689228  
OFFICE TELEPHONE: 618511 RPT 918511.

2. FILE: 201-0958834. RNM 28 APRIL 1979 DRV DGC.1 ALL

SECRET  
SECRET  
BT  
#3072

*Handwritten:*  
Charlotte



4 Apr 79 14:55z

SECRET 140421Z APR 79 STAFF  
CITE DIRECTOR 419468, SECTION 1 OF 2  
TO: ROME INFO TEHRAN.  
UNRETEL RYBAT AJAJA BOHANN.  
REF: TEHRAN 52649

1. PER REF REQUEST, FOLLOWING ARE SUMMARIES OF CASES  
LAATSCH MAY BE EXPECTED TO HANDLE IN TEHRAN:

B. SOPECANYI, AGE 44, IN AUG 1978 WAS UNDERSECRETARY  
OF STATE AND RANKING DEPUTY MINISTER, RSD, FOR BUDGET AFFAIRS.  
HIS PRESENT STATUS IN THE RSD IS STILL UNCERTAIN. HE HAS  
RESIGNED HIS POSITION AND MUST FACE INVESTIGATION BY THE NEW  
REGIME, BECAUSE OF THIS HE HAS REQUESTED NO MEETINGS UNTIL  
LATE APRIL 1979. NEXT MEETING SCHEDULED 27 APRIL. HE WISHES TO  
RETAIN HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH STATION, THOUGH HE WOULD PREFER  
TO NOT HAVE TO MEET CLANDESTINELY. HE WAS SPOTTED AND RECRUITED  
IN SEPTEMBER 1978. SINCE RECRUITMENT HE HAS PROVIDED INFO  
ON GOI PLANS AND INTENTIONS, CABINET ACTIVITIES, AND POLITICAL  
DEVELOPMENTS. HE HAS ALSO OBTAINED USEFUL INFO FROM HIS CONTACT  
IN MILITARY AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS. HE IS INTELLIGENT AND A  
GOOD REPORTER. WHILE HE HAS NOT RECEIVED FORMAL TRADECRAFT  
TRAINING, THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES IN TEHRAN HAVE CAUSED HIM  
TO QUICKLY GET INTO THE HABIT OF CLANDESTINE MEETINGS. HE HAS  
RECENTLY FOLLOWED A RECONTACT PLAN AND HAS CONDUCTED CAR  
MEETINGS WITH HIS NEW CASE OFFICER. HE HAS BEEN TOLD THAT OVERT  
RELATIONSHIP NOT POSSIBLE JUST NOW. SOPECANYI IS COVERED  
UNDER AN NOC AND IS PAID US\$4736 PER MONTH IN LONDON. HE DOES  
NOT LOOK UPON THIS AS A SALARY BUT RATHER A CONTINGENCY FUND,  
TO HELP HIM OR HIS FAMILY IN TIME OF NEED. HIS FAMILY IS  
CURRENTLY IN LONDON. HE ALSO HAS A BROTHER IN THE UNITED  
STATES. IN FEB 79 HE REQUESTED AN ACCOMMODATION EXCHANGE OF  
KIALS 1,500,000 WITH RESULTING DOLLARS TO BE DEPOSITED TO HIS  
BROTHER'S US BANK ACCOUNT. THIS ACCOMMODATION EXCHANGE  
WAS APPROVED AT THE RATE OF 37.5/51 (PREVAILING RATE ON 27 FEB).  
HIS RECORDS DO NOT INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT SOPECANYI WAS  
ADVISED OF THE APPROVAL, OR OF THE RATE AT WHICH THE EXCHANGE

CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN

# MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Faraidoun Nasseri former Senior Deputy  
Minister of Labor and Welfare  
Matthew P. Ward, United States-Iran Joint  
Commission Officer, American Embassy Tehran

DATE & PLACE: 12:00 p.m., June 21, 1977; Chez Maurice,  
Hilton Hotel

SUBJECTS : Dr. Nasseri's Future Plans; the Status of  
the United States-Iran Joint Commission;  
and Manpower in Iran.

DISTRIBUTION: AMB/DCM EB  
ECON/Agatt OES/NET  
POL OES/ENP  
NEA Department of Commerce  
NEA/IRN Department of Agriculture  
Joint Commission Officers: Department of Labor  
AmEmbassy Cairo Department of Transportation  
AmEmbassy Jidda  
AmEmbassy New Delhi  
AmEmbassy Amman  
AmEmbassy Tel Aviv

After initial pleasantries, Ward asked Nasseri why he choose to  
leave the Ministry of Labor and if he planned to continue a gov-  
ernment career. Nasseri emphasized his respect for the new Min-  
ister of Labor, Manuchehr Azmoun, repeating several times that  
he was well qualified for the position. He pointed out however,  
as he has for nearly six months, that he and Dr. Azmoun disagree  
on some fundamental questions concerning the organization of the  
Ministry and that, as far as their two personalities were con-  
cerned, there is a basic "difference de gout." Thus, his depart-  
ure from the Ministry was inescapable. Moreover, Nasseri pointed  
out he has been a Senior Deputy Minister for over three years  
and he is interested in something better (namely a ministry of  
his own). The question of whether he continues in the government  
or finds employment elsewhere has not been settled. Nasseri  
wishes Prime Minister Hoveyda's "placings" before leaving gov-  
ernment service altogether. He explained to Ward that he did not  
wish to leave the public with the impression that he was leaving  
government service because in the last round of appointments of  
cabinet ministers he was not named. Nasseri claims to believe  
that high ranking government officials should regularly be trans-  
ferred to positions in the private sector and successful execu-  
tives in the private sector be brought into the Iranian Govern-  
ment, thus, constantly renewing the pool of management expertise  
available to both sectors. Nasseri would prefer a job in the

CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN

PL 15  
Alm  
6001

Nasseri, Faraidoun

CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN

-2-

private sector but will remain in government service if the Prime Minister insists.

Nasseri confided in Ward that he has been offered the Governor Generalship of either Isfahan or Shiraz, whichever he would prefer. Though he is not interested in living in the "provinces." As Nasseri explains it, the logistics of maintaining a fully staffed residence in a provincial capitol, in Tehran, and in London is too much of a headache. Nasseri has also been asked by his old friend Dr. Shojaeedin Sheikholeslamzadeh, Minister of Health, to assume the responsibilities as manager of Iran's billion dollar a year Social Services Fund. This Fund is the largest single investment fund in Iran and the position of Director brings with it several fringe benefits including a \$3,000 a month salary, twice the salary which Nasseri earned as Deputy Minister of Labor. Nevertheless, Nasseri said he would prefer to leave government service altogether and work in the private sector. He claims he has been offered the position of consultant to a large multi-national firm, which he would not name, at a salary of \$10,000 a month.

#### Government Operations in Iran

Ward asked of Nasseri if he had noticed in the past three years any changes, good or bad, in the organization and operation of the Iranian Government. Nasseri began his reply by stating that there were certain things in Persia that would never change and that there are certain things about governments that would never change. Ministries still tended to be private fiefs of ministers, and there was little or no coordination between ministries at the working level since no good Persian would try to "interfere" with the running of his colleague's domain. Nasseri felt, however, that there was stronger and better coordination at the top levels of government than when he entered government service. While dishonesty and inefficiency still existed in the Iranian Government, Nasseri pointed out that they exist in any government and he felt there were fewer instances today than there had been in the past. Working level personnel are generally better educated now than in the past and most Iranian ministries are beginning "to operate like European ministries." In general, Nasseri felt that there was less wastage than in the past. Ward asked him to compare general operating efficiencies of the Persian bureaucracy with those of other nationalities. Nasseri admitted he was not familiar with working level operations in other ministries but felt that the Ministry of Labor operated as efficient as its British counterpart, but perhaps somewhat less efficient than its West German, French and U.S. counterparts.

CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN

FereyduN NASERI  
(Phonetic: nahsehREE)

IRAN

Under Secretary for  
Planning and Research,  
Ministry of Labor and  
Social Affairs

Addressed as:  
Mr. Nasseri

FereyduN Nasseri, about 39, became Under Secretary for Planning and Research in the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs on 22 May 1974. He had previously served in the Ministry as director general of employment. As such, he was mainly concerned with manpower planning matters and was active in promoting the idea of the creation of a separate and independent employment service.

Nasseri has a master's degree in law, political science and economics from Tehran University and a doctorate in the same subjects from Toulouse University in France, and he came to the United States for a specialized training program in sociopolitical problems. He has taught law at Tehran University and has worked as an attorney in the Ministry of Justice and as an expert in the Plan and Budget Organization. After serving as a consultant to the Embassy in Washington, he returned to Iran to become director of the Bureau of Socio-Economic Studies and Research and Manpower in the Ministry of Labor.

Nasseri has traveled in Western Europe. He speaks fluent English and French.

26 February 1975

*FereyduN NASERI*